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RECONSIDERING RES JUDICATA: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
YUVAL SINAI*
“Res judicata changes white to black and black to white, it makes the
crooked straight and the straight crooked.”1
INTRODUCTION
Final judgments create legal barriers to relitigation. These barriers
are the rules of res judicata (“RJ”), which means “a matter that has been
adjudicated.”2 The term res judicata refers to the various ways in which one
judgment exercises a binding effect on another. The rules of RJ have
undergone a significant change in scope.3 In the old common law, its scope
was quite narrow. A judgment entered in a case on one form of action did
not prevent litigants from pursuing another form of action, although only
one recovery was permitted for a single loss.4 With changes in the rules of
litigation as part of the evolution of modern procedure, the scope of the
rules of RJ is wider. The basic proposition of RJ, however, has remained
the same: a party should not be allowed to relitigate a matter that it has
already litigated.5 As the modern rules of procedure have expanded the
scope of the initial opportunity to litigate, they have correspondingly
limited subsequent opportunities to litigate a subsequent one.6 As we shall
see, this is the clear tendency in the modern law of RJ.
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1. Bourrer's Institute of American Law, quoted in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1471 (4th ed.
1945).
2. See FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 673 (5th ed. 2001).
3. See id. at 674-75.
4. See O.L. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L.J. 614 (1925).
5. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 674-75.
6. Compare Ernst Schopflocher, What Is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the
Doctrine of Res Judicata?, 31 OR. L. REV. 319 (1942), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
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RJ is a classic common law doctrine that applies in the legal systems
of both England7 and the United States.8 Some commentators are of the
opinion that the doctrine is a necessary “product of the adversary system of
litigation practised in English Courts,”9 or, as stated by some U.S. legal
scholars, “[o]ur legal system could not exist without [RJ].”10 The doctrine
of RJ is also a cornerstone of the Canadian legal system.11
Many legal scholars believe that “every legal system has produced a
body of [RJ] law,”12 and some scholars have made unequivocal statements
to that effect. For instance, one legalist asserts that “[t]he doctrine of [RJ] is
a principle of universal jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems of
all civilized nations.”13 Another legalist writes “[it] may be assumed that
the need for finality of judgment is recognized by many, if not by all,
systems of law.”14 A third writes that “[i]t seems clear that the adjudicative
process would fail to serve its social and economic functions if it did not
have [the support of RJ].”15
In this Article I challenge these assumptions and show that some well
known legal systems do not accept the main tenets of RJ. Furthermore, I
demonstrate that these systems may reject RJ for good reasons: the rules of
RJ raise many difficulties and have many drawbacks16—moral, conceptual,
social, and economic—and create problematic incentives for litigating
parties. Indeed, these difficulties and drawbacks do not necessarily lead to a

§24 (1982). See also Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Claim Preclusion: Judgment for the Claimant, 62
NW. U. L. REV. 357 (1967).
7. See, e.g., GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & ALEXANDER K. TURNER, THE DOCTRINE OF RES
JUDICATA (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter BOWER]; NEIL ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 50112 (1994); ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 24 (2d ed. 2006).
8. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (1982); ALLEN D. VESTAL, RES
JUDICATA/PRECLUSION (1969); WARREN FREEDMAN, RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
(1988); ROBERT C. CASAD, RES JUDICATA IN A NUTSHELL (1976); ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M.
CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (2001); DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS (2001); JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at
671-712.
9. BOWER, supra note 7, at 13.
10. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 5 (answering the question whether societies would be
better off without res judicata).
11. DONALD J. LANGE, THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA IN CANADA 4-10 (2d ed. 2004).
12. See, e.g., CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 5.
13. A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 627 (5th ed. 1925).
14. Eliahu Harnon, Res Judicata and Identity of Actions: Law and Rationale, 1 ISR. L. REV. 539,
539 (1966).
15. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 674.
16. For a discussion of these difficulties, see Edward W. Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57
YALE L.J. 339 (1948); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 33-34. The present Article introduces a
larger number of policy considerations in its critique of the rules of res judicata.
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full abandonment of the concept of RJ, for arguments support at least a
minimal concept of RJ. Nevertheless, this Article presents arguments that
should prompt us at least to reconsider the contemporary broad-scope
common law model of RJ.
Martin Shapiro claims that a chief purpose of comparative law should
be to provide data for testing general theories about law.17 Indeed,
examination of legal history reveals that the principle of finality did not
always apply to cases, and parties could reopen a case in some legal
systems. For example, in the procedural systems employed in Jewish
rabbinical courts18 a unique concept of non-finality of judgments prevails.19
This existed both in ancient Talmudic and post-Talmudic law, and still
exists in present-day rabbinical courts in the State of Israel.
Comparative law truly holds exciting potential to help us better
understand law and legal systems, because it offers, as argued by John C.
Reitz, at least two significant intellectual benefits that are not easily
obtained outside the comparative method: “(1) the tendency to push
analytic categories to higher levels of abstraction in order to bridge
differences between legal systems, and (2) the tendency to force the
researcher to expand the analysis to include the whole legal system and its
relationship with the rest of human culture and its material and spiritual
context in order to understand the differences and similarities observed.”20
The present Article seeks to accomplish these two benefits of comparative
law. Furthermore, Reitz asserts that “the comparative method has the
potential to lead to even more interesting analysis by inviting the
comparatist to give reasons for the similarities and differences among legal
systems and to analyze their significance for cultures under study.”21
Indeed, a good comparatist should consider not only global comparison of
legal systems, but also similarities and differences in the respective
political and historical traditions of which they are a part.22 This Article
reveals both legal and cultural differences between Jewish tradition and
dominant Western societies.
Modern analyses of procedural rules among widely divergent legal
systems have prompted many to question—and sometimes change—the

17. MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS, at vii (1980).
18. See generally Haim H. Cohn & Yuval Sinai, Practice and Procedure, in 16 ENCYCLOPAEDIA
JUDAICA 434, 434-46 (2d ed. 2007).
19. For the Jewish law perspective, see generally Moshe Chigier, The Doctrine of Res Judicata, 8
JEWISH L. ANN. 127, 129-34 (1989).
20. John C. Reitz, How to Do Comparative Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 636 (1998).
21. Id. at 626.
22. Id. at 627.
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rules in their own legal system, often importing these rules from other
systems. A central axis of comparison runs between the adversarial system,
practiced in common law countries such as England and the United States,
and the inquisitorial system, practiced in the European continent. An
additional axis of comparison extends between the adversarial-inquisitorial
systems on the one hand and the procedural system of Jewish law on the
other. The body of legal literature that compares these systems takes into
account not only legal rules but also cultural differences between Judaism
and dominant Western society. Some scholars believe that Jewish law
provides a basis for the reform and development of Western law.23 In the
United States, some scholars use—and often reinterpret—Jewish law to
provide a counter-model to dominant conceptions in contemporary U.S.
legal theory.24 The comparative research presented below can serve as a
paradigm for dealing with the subject of procedure in light of the conflict
between common law, European Continental law, and Jewish law. The
present article analyzes the justifications, advantages, and disadvantages of
three models of RJ: (a) the broad-scope common law model; (b) the
narrow-scope German–Continental model; and (c) the non-finality of
judgments model prevalent in Jewish Law. Nevertheless, the present
Article does not show, for instance, why and how the Jewish system should
be followed by common law RJ systems.
Part I presents an overview of the broad common law model of RJ
and the main justifications for the rules of RJ. Analysis shows that the best
reason for accepting the rules of RJ in Anglo-American law should be
based on the “conflict solving” approach of the adversarial system rather
than on many of the more traditional justifications, which are more
rhetorical arguments than sensible rationales.
Part II contains an extensive analysis of conceptual arguments against
the common law rules of RJ from three major perspectives: (a) the behavior
modification model; (b) the valued features of the adversarial process; and
(c) economic cost efficiency. I argue that the rules of RJ are not consistent
with several important aspects of the behavior modification model, that the
doctrine does not necessarily contribute to an economically efficient legal
system, and that it contradicts many of the prized features of AngloAmerican procedure, such as litigant autonomy, litigants’ opportunities to
plead their case, correctness, revisionism, and consistency.
23. See, e.g., PATRICK GLENN, THE LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 120-21 (2007).
24. See Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1993). For an example of a
comparative research dealing with procedural law, see Yuval Sinai, Affirmative Defenses in Civil
Cases: Between Common Law and Jewish Law, 34 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 111 (2008).
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Part III reviews the narrow continental model of RJ applied in
Germany. Although this model appears to be superior according to the
three standards noted above to the broader common law rules of RJ, its cost
efficiency raises some difficulties.
Part IV reviews the unique non-finality of judgments model practiced
in Jewish Law, in which the judge can reconsider his initial decision and
render a revised decision if needed, resulting in an efficient judicial process
of error correction. I also examine the balanced approach of Jewish Law,
from the perspectives of behavior modification and cost efficiency, with
regard to the doctrine of cause of action/issue preclusion. The unique
concept of the non-finality of judgment is a central feature of the Jewish
legal system, a system of law in which all elements of justice are
subordinated to the discovery of the truth, and which was not designed
exclusively to promote conflict resolution, as arguably is the case with the
common law.
Part V presents a comparative analysis of the three models and argues
that the non-finality of judgments system practiced in the Jewish law model
is preferable in many respects to the common law or the German models of
RJ, although some good arguments support at least a minimal concept of
RJ.
I. FIRST MODEL: BROAD-SCOPE RES JUDICATA
A. Overview of the Common law Rules of RJ
In common law systems the doctrine of RJ has two main forms: in
England25 and Canada,26 the forms are called “issue estoppel” and “cause of
action estoppel;” in U.S. terminology, the two forms are referred to as
“issue preclusion” (traditionally known as “collateral estoppel”) and “claim
preclusion” respectively.27 In Arnold v. National Westminster Bank,28 the
House of Lords explained these two forms, as they are applied in English
common law, as follows:
Cause of action estoppel arises where the cause of action in the later
proceedings is identical to that in the earlier proceedings, the latter
having been between the same parties or their privies and having

25.
26.
27.
28.
Eng.).

See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 503.
See LANGE, supra note 11, at 1.
See, e.g., VESTAL, supra note 8, at 13-15.
Arnold v. Nat’l Westminster Bank, [1991] 2 A.C. 93 (H.L.) [104-05] (appeal taken from
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involved the same subject matter . . . . [The] bar is absolute in relation
to all points decided unless fraud or collusion is alleged . . . .29

“Issue estoppel may arise where a particular issue forming a necessary
ingredient in a cause of action has been litigated and decided and in
subsequent proceedings between the same parties involving a different
cause of action to which the same issue is relevant one of the parties seeks
to re-open that issue.”30
There is an important requirement in English law: in both cause of
action and issue estoppels,31 the estoppel applies not only to points that
have actually been decided but also to points “which properly belonged to
the subject of litigation and which the parties, exercising reasonable
diligence, might have brought forward at the time.”32 It is emphasized by
Zuckerman: “[t]he bar to advancing an identical cause of action is
absolute.”33
Similar definitions and distinctions between issue and cause of action
estoppel are accepted in the Canadian legal system.34 The key principles
governing cause of action estoppel in Canadian courts35 are similar to the
English ones: “the plaintiff must present the subject matter of the entire
case relating to the cause of action at one time, once and for all; and any
remedy following from the cause of action is based on that subject matter.”
The same principle applies to defendants.36 All subject matter germane to
the claim or defense that could have been presented in the first action by
exercise of reasonable diligence, but was not, is estopped in a second
action.37

29. Id. at 104.
30. Id. at 105.
31. See ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 504.
32. Henderson v. Henderson, (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115; 67 E.R. 313, 320.
33. ZUCKERMAN, supra note 7, at 939. The author comments further:
Neither the discovery of new evidence that could not have been known before, nor a change
in the law since the first decision, can justify reopening an adjudicated cause of action. The
only way of reviving the cause of action is by having the original judgment set aside on
grounds of fraud.
Id. at 939-40.
34. See, e.g., LANGE, supra note 11, at 4.
35. The key principles were quoted approvingly in Laufer v. Canadian Investment Protection
Fund, [2004] O.J. No. 4016, para. 7 (S.C.J.). See id. at 125. For the key principles of issue estoppel, see
id. at 25.
36. Id. In other words, the defendant must present both the entire defense related to the subject
matter at one time, once and for all, and any related counterclaim that is not a separate and distinct
cause of action. See id.
37. A separate and distinct cause of action, however, is not governed by the cause of action
estoppel and need not to be brought in the same action, either as a claim by the plaintiff or as a
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The U.S. legal system uses similar definitions and distinctions. In U.S.
terminology, “claim preclusion” refers to the effects of a former judgment
on a second action, when the second action proceeds on all or part of the
claim that was the subject of the first action.38 The judgment “bars” or
annuls the entire cause of action or claim, including items that were not
raised in the former action. The U.S. Supreme Court formulated the
concept of claim preclusion as a final judgment on the merits that were or
could have been raised in that action.39 But what does the term “claim”
mean for RJ purposes? The old view and the modern one differ.40 The
present trend in the United States is to regard a “claim” in factual terms and
make it coterminous with the transaction, irrespective of what substantive
theories or forms of relief may be available to the plaintiff; irrespective of
what or how many primary rights may have been infringed upon; and
irrespective of how different the evidence needed to support the theories or
rights may be.41 The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity,
and it cannot be divided. In other words, according to the modern,
transactional view of RJ, the plaintiff should fully litigate all grievances
arising from a transaction in a single lawsuit, just as the plaintiff would do
under the modern rules of procedure.42 As Casad commented, the rationale
of this transactional view “is that this view increases efficiency, with an
acceptable burden on fairness.”43
The concept of claim preclusion is also referred to as “the rule against
splitting a single cause of action.”44 The bar of a judgment for the
defendant extinguishes the entire cause of action or claim, including items
of the claim that were not in fact raised in the former action.45 The plaintiff
can no longer sue on the original cause of action or any item of it even if

counterclaim by the defendant. Another key principle is that the cause of action estoppel applies to the
same parties and their privies, in the second action and in a second proceeding that is not an action. See
generally id.
38. See JAMES, supra note 2, at 675-76.
39. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
40. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 62:
[T]he old view, to which some jurisdictions still adhere, defines cause of action more
narrowly in terms of a single theory or a single substantive right or remedy of the plaintiff.
The modern view is that a claim includes all theories' bestowal of rights on the plaintiff to
remedies against the defendant with respect to the transaction from which the action arose.
(emphasis in original).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
42. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 62.
43. Id.
44. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 676.
45. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17 cmt. b, 19 (1982).
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that item was omitted from the original action.46 A second effect of RJ,
referred to in the United States as “issue preclusion,” is that an issue
adjudicated in a prior action cannot be relitigated if it arises in a later action
based on a different claim or demand.47
The present Article deals mainly with claim preclusion and especially
with the rule against splitting a claim/cause of action. As we have seen, in
common law systems a plaintiff who obtains a judgment on a cause of
action cannot initiate a second action on the same cause of action, although
some exceptions to the general rule have been carved out in some common
law systems in unusual circumstances.48 For example, Rules 59 and 60 of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prescribe diverse circumstances
in which an American federal court might reopen a case to correct a case.49
Injunctions are generally open to reconsideration if erroneous.50
B. Rationale and Justifications
1. Public Policy and Individual Rights
The justification for the common law rules of RJ has been debated
extensively by legal scholars.51 In Anglo-American legal systems, this
justification is usually based on two theories.52 First, it is in the general
public interest to end disputes that have already been litigated by
establishing the finality of judicial decisions.53 Lord Simon of Gaisdale
expressed this idea:

46. See id. § 17 cmt. a, 18.
47. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 676.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26 (1982); BOWER, supra note 7, at 149-151,
378-80 (for the doctrine of RJ in England); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 85-106 (for the
doctrine of RJ in the U.S.); LANGE, supra note 11, at 231-84 (for the doctrine of RJ in Canada);
VESTAL, supra note 8, at 103.
49. See FED. R. CIV. P. 59, 60. Similar rules abide in most, perhaps all, state courts. Also note the
law-equity distinction and the willingness of American "chancellors" to correct mistakes in the ancient
tradition of Chancery. For the rise of equity and the chancellor's decree in United States, see JAMES ET
AL., supra note 2, at 16-22.
50. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b); JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 789-90.
51. See, e.g., Allan D. Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 29 (1964); see
generally Harnon, supra note 14, at 542-50; BOWER, supra note 7, at 10-15; VESTAL, supra note 8, at
7-12; CLEARY, supra note 16; ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 511; Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 444-45 (1973);
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 29-38; JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 671-74; LANGE, supra
note 11, at 4-9.
52. See, e.g., BOWER, supra note 7, at 10-11; VESTAL, supra note 8, at 8-9; Vestal supra note 51.
53. See, e.g., Stiftung v. Rayner & Keeler Ltd. [1967] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 853 (U.K.).
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There is a fundamental principle of English law . . . generally
expressed by a Latin maxim which can be translated: “It is in the
interest of society that there should be some end to litigation . . . .”
Important though the issues may be, how extensive so ever the
evidence, whatever the eagerness for further fray, society says: “We
have provided courts in which your rival contentions have been heard.
We have provided a code of law by which they have been adjudged.
Since judges and juries are fallible human beings, we have provided
appellate courts which do their own fallible best to correct error. But in
the end you must accept what has been decided. Enough is enough.”
And the law echoes: “res judicata, the matter is adjudged.”54

The second justification for RJ is the individual’s right of protection
from repetitive litigation. This rationale of RJ was formulated more than
four centuries ago by Lord Coke in the Ferrer case:
[O]therwise great oppression might be done under colour and pretence
of law; for if there should not be an end to suits, then a rich and
malicious man would infinitely vex him who hath right by suits and
actions; and in the end (because he cannot come to any end) compel
him (to redeem to his charge and vexation) to leave and relinquish his
right . . . .55

Canadian courts also traditionally base RJ upon these two policy
considerations,56 as evident in the judgment by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Clark v. Phinney, which indicates that RJ must be applied
because of the following public policy reasons: “[T]hat judgment must
conclude the parties and negative the defence here as well upon the ground
of public policy.” 57
2. Economic Efficiency of the Courts
Another common justification for the RJ rules is the need to end
litigation in order to ensure the economic efficiency of the courts and the
speedy termination of controversies. The doctrine of RJ is thus applied to
avoid squandering the courts’ resources and imposing additional costs on
the litigants.58 Litigating the same matter more than once defeats this
purpose.59

54. The Ampthill Peerage Case [1977] A.C. (H.L.) 547 at 575-76 (U.K.).
55. Ferrer v. Arden (1599) 77 Eng Rep. 263, 266; 6 Co. Rep. 7 a (Eng.).
56. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 4-6.
57. Clark v. Phinney [1896] S.C.R. 633, 642-44 (Can.).
58. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that these policy considerations have been expressed
also by the Canadian courts).
59. See Vestal, supra note 6, at 31-32; VESTAL, supra note 8, at 10-12.
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3. Consistency and Stability
RJ is also justified as a means to reduce controversies and disputes
and to promote stability,60 an important requirement of judgments of the
court.61 It is in the public interest to seek to prevent, or at least reduce, the
possibility of inconsistent judgments.62 Inconsistent judgments undermine
the courts’ prestige and the respect the courts inspire.63 According to some
Anglo-American jurists, RJ supports the prestige of the courts.64 Moreover,
courts tend to respect the decisions of other courts, a practice that fosters a
general attitude that later decisions should be consistent with earlier ones.
Canadian courts also agree that the doctrine of RJ avoids conflicting
decisions and promotes both confidence in the courts and predictability.65
4. Summary
The English jurist Andrews sums up the dominant Anglo-American
rationale and justification of RJ:
The “principle of finality” is rooted in several inter-related policies. If
a decision were not treated as final, many inconveniences would result:
the dispute would continue to drag on; greater legal expense and delay
would result; scarce “judge-time” would be spent re-hearing the
matter; inconsistent decisions might follow; litigation would cease to
be a credible means of settling disputes; finally, it would be a hardship
on the victorious party if the first case were to be re-opened; the victor
is entitled to assume that at the first action he was not merely attending
a dress rehearsal for further performances.66

Some of these policies raise issues of private justice between the
parties, upholding their expectations that the judgment will not be
undermined by later proceedings and protecting each party from delaying
tactics. But most of the arguments are expressions of public policy:
[T]he promotion of economical litigation; the need to ration judicial
and other court time and resources; avoidance of inconsistent
decisions; prevention of additional delay in the disposal of litigation;
60. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 675; Harnon, supra note 14, at 544.
61. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 675 (noting that the importance lies not only in that the
parties and others can rely on the judgments in ordering their practical affairs and be protected from
repeated litigation, but also in upholding the moral force of court judgments).
62. See, e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 511.
63. See, e.g., State Hosp. v. Consol. Water Co., 267 Pa. 29, 38 (1920) ("The doctrine of res
judicata . . . produces certainty as to individual rights and gives dignity and respect to judicial
proceedings.").
64. See VESTAL, supra note 8, at 12; Harnon, supra note 14, at 544; Vestal, supra note 6, at 33.
65. See LANGE, supra note 11, at 7.
66. ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 511.
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preserving the authority of courts to reach decisions which will be
presumptively binding. . . These considerations of public policy and
private justice apply most clearly to the general rule set out above of
cause of action and issue estoppels.67

C. RJ and the Adversarial System
I maintain that the traditional justifications presented above are not the
major reason for accepting RJ in its broad scope. A legal system that favors
a broad-scope RJ, such as the common law, reflects an approach that in
principle emphasizes such values as public interest, consistency, stability,
and efficiency over revealing the truth. However, in modern common law,
RJ is often not applied in a way consistent with the major justifications
provided by the common law jurists.68 Furthermore, Anglo-American law
accepts only a relative concept of RJ, rather than the absolute concept
described above.
For example, to consider a plea of RJ, courts expect the parties to raise
it explicitly,69 because courts will not do so on their own initiative.70 This
approach reflects undue emphasis on the private interest of the parties in
applying RJ, rather than on the public interest. It also shows that in AngloAmerican law RJ is applied not according to the main justification of the
public interest. If the main rationale for RJ were indeed the public interest,
the litigants’ wishes or convenience would be of no relevance to a
determination of RJ. The decisive factor would be the mere fact that a
former judgment on the same case already exists. After a judgment has
been handed down and the court has settled the controversy between the
parties, further resort to the court on the same matter would be a waste of
courts’ time.71 But, in the Anglo-American view, the court can ignore
former judgments if nobody complains of being vexed or harassed.72

67. Id.
68. See Harnon, supra note 14, at 544-49.
69. Id. at 549.
70. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 1(a) (1942) ("Although the
principle is based upon the interest of the public as well as that of the parties, yet if the prior judgment
is not relied upon in pleadings or in evidence in the new action, the prior judgment will not preclude the
new litigation of matters determined by the judgment. The court does not take judicial notice of the
existence of the defense of res judicata.").
71. See Harnon, supra note 14, at 547.
72. Of course, the fact that the American legal system sometimes values procedure over substance
does not necessarily stand for the proposition that the system does not value fair results. In addition, the
fact that an issue will not be re-litigated absent a party’s request is probably more a reflection of the
adversary system than any reflection of the system’s lack of concern for a just outcome; in the United
States, judges cannot re-open cases sua sponte. Furthermore, some U.S. court decisions tend to deviate
from the above principle and permit the court to initiate RJ. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v.
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Although the public interest rationale of RJ is justified by the general
trend to promote stability, certainty, and consistency, in practice modern
Anglo-American rules often do not promote these values. For example, the
major trend in the development of the modern doctrine of RJ expands the
theoretical applicability of the preclusion rules,73 at the same time
recognizing and generating ever more broad exceptions to this doctrine.74
For example, English law provides that new evidence unavailable at the
time of trial can constitute under certain circumstances an exception to the
application of RJ.75
Some commentators question the desirability of many aspects of this
trend.76 It is clear that this trend does not contribute to certainty and
consistency, because in many cases it is not clear whether the action under
preclusion or it fits into one of the exeptions. Although, in many cases, all
the factors of the action appear to support a general rule of preclusion, in
any individual case, these same factors may call for non-preclusion,
justifying a special exception to the rule. Another factor causing
uncertainty and inconsistency is the variety of definitions offered by
judges, scholars, and statute-writers to the phrase “cause of action”: the
broader the definition, the broader the scope of preclusion. Despite the
attempts made to find an acceptable definition of “cause of action,”77 no
consensus has been reached.78
It appears, therefore, that RJ should be understood in the AngloAmerican systems as a product of the competing private interests that are
valued in the adversarial system, rather than as a principle rooted in the
traditional proffered justifications, which appear to be more rhetorical than
actual bases for RJ. The explanation of the well-known English jurist John
Salmond illustrates this contention:
A judgment is conclusive evidence as between the parties, and
sometimes against all the world, of the matter adjudicated upon. The

United States, 688 F.2d 767, 771 (Ct. Cl. Sept. 8, 1982); Walsh v. Int’l Longshoremen's Ass’n, 630 F.
2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1980); Boone v. Kurtz, 617 F.2d 435, 436 (5th Cir. 1980).
73. For the wider modern scope of finality, see JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 674-75.
74. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 36. Exceptions to RJ are indicated in the sources
cited infra note 131.
75. See e.g., ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 505.
76. See, e.g., CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 36.
77. For a summary of the different definitions see JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 684-88. See also
Cleary, supra note 16, at 341-42 (criticizing the extensive efforts to define cause of action).
78. See Harnon, supra note 14, at 550-59. Furthermore, in my opinion, it is not easy to justify RJ
on the grounds of the public interests to prevent inconsistent judgments and to contribute the prestige of
courts. Is the law always against inconsistent judgments? By granting a right of appeal the law in fact
invites such possible inconsistencies.
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Court of Justice may make mistakes but no one will be heard to say so.
For their function is to terminate disputes and their decisions must be
accepted as final beyond question.79

RJ is justified by the view that the function of the courts is “to
terminate disputes.” This view is typical of the adversarial system, but it is
doubtful whether it would be accepted by other legal traditions that hold
different conceptual views about the role of the court. Bower and Turner
maintained that the doctrine of RJ “is the product of the adversary system
of litigation practised in English Courts. Its essence is that as between
opposed parties an issue, once litigated, should be regarded as for ever
decided.”80 They added that, “in a different system of jurisprudence where
the court exercised an inquisitorial function, it might be thought unjust or
inexpedient that it should be impeded in its search for truth by the principle
res judicata . . . . But this is not the system under which English courts
administer justice . . . .”81
In The Faces of Justice and State Authority, Mirjan Damaska stated
that the doctrine of RJ can be justified only by the conflict-solving model
of the Anglo-American adversarial legal system.82 According to this
approach, the conflict-solving style of proceedings used in common law
systems is averse to changing decisions, even if they are based on legal or
factual error, because substantively correct outcomes are relatively less
important to adversarial legal systems operating in reactive governments.83
The great desire for stability, typical to common law adversarial systems,
produces a broad preclusion effect on future litigation.84 In the conflictsolving, purely adversarial model, reconsideration of decisions “can occur
only on the initiative of the parties, not as part of the court’s official
duty.”85 Damaska concludes his analysis of RJ as follows:
To an outside observer, a system of justice may seem seriously
flawed—perhaps even perverse—where fairness of procedure can
justify a substantively erroneous decision and where faulty procedures
can undermine substantively correct decisions:86 the cart appears to be

79. JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 484 (Williams eds., 10th ed. 1947) (1920).
80. BOWER, supra note 7, at 13-14 (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 14.
82. See MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 145-46 (1986).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 86.
86. This is related to another important feature of the res judicata rules under common law, as
Damaska points out:
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put before the horse. But in a justice administration that values the
integrity of the contest above the attainment of accurate outcomes on
the merits, this result seems perfectly normal and acceptable.87

The role of an adversarial trial judge is generally compared with that
of a referee in a game in which he plays no active part,88 his function being
restricted to ensuring that the parties comply with the rules of the game.89
The adversarial system has been compared to a competition in which the
party breaching the rules of the game incurs a technical loss, and the winner
is determined by comparing the parties’ competitive levels at the end of the
game.90 Many scholars are of the opinion that the major goal of the judge in
the adversarial system is not to reveal the truth but to resolve disputes and
to choose between the contentions of law and fact laid before him by the
litigants.91 In this type of legal system, the rules of RJ, favoring values
other than truth finding, and the fact that the courts do not consider the
rules of RJ on their own initiative, make more sense.92
II. CRITIQUE OF RJ: CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES
A. General Methodological Goals
As illustrated above, some justifications exist for at least a minimal
application of RJ. However, the rules of RJ also create many conceptual
difficulties and have many drawbacks. These difficulties, nonetheless, do
not necessarily invalidate the concept of RJ, but they should prompt us to
reconsider the contemporary broad-scope common law model of RJ.
British jurists have voiced criticisms of the doctrine of RJ, but the
principal questions they have raised concern individual aspects of the
While even substantively erroneous decisions can enjoy a high degree of immunity from
subsequent change, this immunity does not extend to decisions obtained through unfair
practice or fraud. Where the winner of the forensic contest has engaged in some sort of "foul
play," subsequent discovery and revelation of his misconduct may revive the dispute laid to
rest in the decision. Res judicata loses its bindingness when it does not emanate from a fair
contest: fraus omnia corrumpit (fraud spoils everything).
Id. at 145.
87. Id.
88. See Jones v. Nat’l Coal Bd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 55 at 63 (Eng.).
89. See id.
90. Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal
Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 581 (1973).
91. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law Jurisdictions,
73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1019 (1998); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, READING ON ADVERSARIAL
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION 3 (1988); cf. Marvin Frankel, The Search for
Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (1975) (“[O]ur adversary system rates truth
too low among the values that institutions of justice are meant to serve.”).
92. Cf., e.g., JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-8.
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doctrine and matters of detail, rather than the doctrine as a whole.93 In an
article published in 1948, Edward Cleary initiated a reexamination of RJ,94
but the conceptual difficulties of the doctrine have yet to be thoroughly
examined in general. The following critique of RJ has three major
methodological goals: to (a) reexamine the rules of RJ in light of the
behavior modification model; (b) establish whether the doctrine of RJ
serves the ostensibly valued features of the adversarial systems; and (c)
evaluate the economic efficiency of RJ.
1. Reexamining RJ in the Light of the Behavior Modification Model
In his essay, Kenneth Scott presents two models of the civil process:
the conflict resolution model and the behavior modification model.95 The
conflict resolution model regards civil procedure “primarily as a method of
achieving peaceful settlement of private disputes.”96 In the interests of
preserving the peace, society offers through the courts a mechanism for
impartial judgment of personal grievances as an alternative to retaliation or
forcible self-help. By contrast, the behavior modification model “sees the
courts and the civil process as a way of altering behavior by” exacting a
price for undesirable behavior.97 The emphasis, in this case, is not on “the
resolution of the immediate dispute but [on] its effect on the future conduct
of others.”98 Scott argues that these two models conflict only if the first is
taken as exclusive, as defining the outer bounds of the proper use of the
civil process. Presently, that seems too often to be the case. “The Conflict
Resolution Model is in the ascendant, and its implications seem to be
carrying the day, at least in the federal courts.”99 Scott “urge[s] a more
careful consideration of the claims and implications of the behavior
modification model.”100 RJ defines the outer bounds of the civil process, so
we should conduct a careful consideration of the implications of the
behavior modification model on RJ.

93. See BOWER, supra note 7, at 12:
It has been questioned, for instance, whether judgments by default ought always to have the
same authority, binding the parties by estoppel per rem judicatam, as judgments in which the
issues have been decided after contest; and, again, whether judgments in foreign courts should
not be more carefully examined, before being held to be binding by estoppel, than domestic
judgments.
94. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
95. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-40 (1975).
96. Id. at 937.
97. Id. at 938.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 950.
100. Id.
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2. Does RJ Serve the Valued Features of Adversarial Systems?
RJ is considered to be the product of the conflict resolution model of
the adversarial system of litigation practiced in English and U.S. courts.
The premise of U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as indicated in Rule
1, is that “they should be construed and administered to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”101
But in practice, the effects of RJ are not consistent with some of the main
characteristics of the Anglo-American system. In the following sections I
reexamine the doctrine of RJ in light of some of the twelve valued features
of the procedural system, as identified by Judith Resnik,102 such as litigant
autonomy, litigants’ persuasion opportunities, correctness, revisionism,
consistency, and economy.103 The reexamination reveals that RJ stands in
tension with many of these features.
3. Economic Efficiency
A major feature of civil procedure is ensuring that the legal system
produces results with the least possible expenditure of time, money, and
energy.104 Economic considerations legitimize the outcomes on the ground
that the decisions are rendered with the interests of both the individual and
society in mind.105 Many consider RJ to contribute significantly to the
economic efficiency of the courts. But others consider this justification to
be insufficient, as Edward Cleary argued:
Courts exist for the purpose of trying lawsuits. If the courts are too
busy to decide cases fairly and on the merits, something is wrong.
Decision solely in terms of the convenience of the court approaches the
theory that the individual exists for the state. Maintenance of the
judicial system is a very minor portion of the cost of government. If
the judges are too few to be able to decide cases fairly and on the
merits, the public probably can afford to have more judges.106

“Decisions about whether and how to economize often occur at points
of tension between individuals’ and the public’s needs,” and cutting costs
can mean sacrificing other valued needs, as in the case of RJ.107 Even if we
reject Cleary’s view, the doctrine of RJ remains problematic in many ways.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
102. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 840, 844-59 (1984).
103. Resnik identifies six other values that are not relevant to our discussion because they deal with
the structure of the decisionmakers’ system. See generally id.
104. See, e.g., id. at 857-58; JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 381-83.
105. Resnik, supra note 102, at 857.
106. Cleary, supra note 16, at 348.
107. Resnik, supra note 102, at 857. For another example of the tension between individual and
public needs, see id.
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As illustrated below, RJ does not necessarily contribute to producing an
economically efficient legal system.108
B. Litigants’ Perspective
1. Litigant Autonomy
The first valued feature of the adversarial system that Resnik mentions
is litigant autonomy.109 In the Anglo-American adversarial system,
litigation is generally prosecuted by the parties, not by the court, for each
party knows best how to manage its own affairs and should therefore
conduct its own litigation.110 The value at stake is the preservation of
individual freedom in democratic society, and litigants express this
freedom by conducting their own legal affairs.111 The judge expresses these
values through self-restraint and not interfering in the proceedings.112
In the Anglo-American system, litigants can make their way alone,
define the parameters of their disputes, and select the types of relief sought.
In this approach, the parties are free to press or waive points as they see fit,
and society’s interest in guaranteeing the citizens’ legal rights is adequately
served by the parties enforcing their self-interest.113
Clearly, the concept of RJ contradicts the litigants’ autonomy—
especially when dealing with claim preclusion, which forces the plaintiff to
present the entire case relating to the cause of action as well as every
remedy sought at one time, once and for all. James, Hazard, and Leubsdorf
note the conflict between the two fundamental goals of civil procedure:
On the one hand, the procedural system aims to permit full
development of the contentions and evidentiary possibilities of the
various parties so that the case is decided on the merits. On the other
hand, the system also aims to bring an adjudication to a final
conclusion with reasonable promptness at a reasonable cost. By and

108. I accept the more balanced view expressed by Casad & Clermont:
A fuller explanation of the policies that detail res judicata would recognize that efficiency
factors can counsel not only for but also against preclusion. Moreover, although some
arguments that draw instead on fairness do favor preclusion, powerful fairness concerns cut
the other way, counseling either to stop the rule of res judicata short of the particular case or
to create an exception to the rule of res judicata for the particular case. Finally, res judicata
does not exist in a procedural vacuum, but responds to specific substantive policies as well.
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 30-31.
109. Resnik, supra note 102, at 845-47.
110. See Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE
L.J. 480, 535 (1975).
111. See id.
112. See id..
113. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-5.
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large, modern procedure gives greater weight to the first of these
objectives during the course of a proceeding.114

The rules permit the presentation of alternative positions and
considerable freedom in developing both claim and defense during the trial.
Similar liberality should be allowed after the judgment, as noted by James,
Hazard, and Leubsdorf:
There is, in principle, no reason why the rules of res judicata could not
be limited to the narrow question whether the prior action actually
decided the issues necessarily involved in awarding the judgment. This
could be called a minimal concept of res judicata; without it, a
judgment would not conclusively decide anything. It seems clear that
the adjudicative process would fail to serve its social and economic
functions if it did not have this minimal effect.115

2. Litigants’ Persuasion Opportunities
The second valued feature, litigants’ persuasion opportunities, reflects
a belief that [a dispute should be resolved] only after the parties have had
an opportunity to be heard” by the judge. 116 The persuasion opportunities
of litigants are a valued feature mainly because of their relationship to
outcomes, as explained by Resnik:
[P]ersuasion opportunities provide an information basis for case
disposition. If one assumes the possibility of “correctness,” of results
that accurately reflect fact and law, then the information obtained
through persuasion enhances decisionmakers’ abilities to base their
conclusions on the “true” facts, to apply the law “correctly,” and to
provide the “right” remedy.117

Errors cannot always be corrected in the appellate court, and the rules
of RJ limit the litigant’s persuasion opportunities by blocking the litigants’
opportunity to persuade the trial court to reverse an incorrect judgment.
Claim preclusion presents the same problem, as it often shuts the door on a
plaintiff who forgot to include a specific claim for remedy in his initial
cause of action. In this case, the plaintiff is deprived of any persuasion
opportunity.

114. Id. at 673.
115. Id. at 674. Furthermore, the authors stress that appeal could be, but is not, an opportunity for
the comprehensive reconsideration of the case. Motions for extraordinary relief from judgments could
serve a similar function, but they do not because they their scope is much more limited. See id. at 74095.
116. Resnik, supra note 102, at 847.
117. Id. at 848.
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An important constitutional value is that civil courts ensure access to
judicial decisionmaking.118 Citizenship entails not only “access to the
government decisionmakers but [also] the opportunity to participate in the
shaping of government policy.”119 Owen Fiss argues that “courts exist to
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.”120 Access and
participation are not merely important, but, according to Leubsdorf, “they
are constitutionally important,” and therefore “one should protect the rights
of citizens to enter the courthouse and argue before the judges.”121 But one
of the main obstacles that interferes with the constitutional civil procedure
is “the doctrine of res judicata, which could be interpreted as barring the
relitigation in federal court of a constitutional claim that was raised or
might have been raised in a state court.”122 Leubsdorf believes that
“[a]lthough the Court has embraced the broad application of res judicata to
Civil Rights Act suits, it is not obliged to continue doing so.”123
The requirement of due process is arguably limited to ensuring that
. . . the parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their
positions on the issues in dispute . . . [and] given the costliness of
relitigation, the same parties should not be allowed to present the same
matter for resolution to a court again. One full and fair day in court is
enough. There must be an end to litigation, even if the first judgment
was actually erroneous.124

But this “is a gross simplification,” 125 as Casad and Clermont, two
leading scholars of RJ, explain when discussing the drawbacks of the
traditional justification of RJ:
In the first place, this explanation conflates issue preclusion, which
reaches only matters actually litigated and determined, with claim
preclusion, which blocks “relitigation” of matters never even litigated.
In the second place, this explanation fails to predict the considerable
complexity of res judicata doctrine, constructed as it is of fine rules
and peppered as it is with fuzzy exceptions. In the third place, this
explanation has managed to pervert res judicata on recent occasions,

118. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 591, 597-99
(1984).
119. Id. at 597.
120. Owen M. Fiss, Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979). See also Scott,
supra note 95.
121. Leubsdorf, supra note 118, at 598.
122. Id. at 606.
123. Id.
124. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 30.
125. Id.
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because its simplistic emphasis on judicial economy can blind courts to
other relevant policies that would argue against expanding res
judicata”126

Thus, because RJ is a drastic measure, it should be applied only in
clear cases when a matter has been specifically litigated and a litigant has
had his actual day in court.127 It ought not to be extended to matters that
could or should have been raised and litigated in the first action.
3. The Effect of Claim Preclusion on the Conduct of Litigation
a. The Behavior Modification Model Perspective
The rule of claim preclusion and the rule against splitting a single
claim are considered by many as a fundamental contribution to the
efficiency of judicial proceedings, as emphasized by Robert C. Casad:
“Modern procedure seeks to maximize the efficiency of judicial proceeding
by encouraging the presentation of all claims that can conveniently be tried
together in the framework of a single law suit.”128
This traditional approach assumes that an efficient judicial system
should seek to include all actions and remedies in a single “claim.”
Nevertheless, I argue that the rules of RJ, especially those of claim
preclusion, are inconsistent with the behavior modification model because
their impact on the conduct of litigation is in many cases negative and
harmful.
The rule of claim preclusion is often referred to as prohibiting the
splitting of a cause of action.129 If plaintiffs fail to include any part of a
demand or cause of action in the first action, they cannot bring another
action to claim the omitted part after judgment has been pronounced,
whether as an item of damage or a ground of recovery.130 In most common
law systems, a plaintiff who obtains a judgment on a claim cannot initiate a
second action on the same claim, although some exceptions to the general
rule have been carved out in unusual circumstances.131

126. Id.
127. A similar approach was expressed by the English court in Ord v. Ord [1923] KB 432 at 439
(Eng.). But further on, the court stated the traditional, broader definition of RJ.
128. CASAD, supra note 8, at 26.
129. See JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 676.
130. See, e.g., id. at 685.
131. See, e.g., VESTAL, supra note 8, at 103; CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 85-106;
BOWER, supra note 7, at 149-51, 378-80; LANGE, supra note 11, at 231-84.
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Insisting on the inclusion of all distinct claims in one action has some
disadvantages,132 for litigants may argue each point with greater intensity
for fear of the future effects of RJ. The rule of claim preclusion forces
plaintiffs to include all the claims and remedies that may be developed
from one cause of action, significantly aggravating the dispute between the
parties and forcing them to litigate their potential claims to the utmost.133
What are the effects of the rule against splitting a single claim on the
plaintiff’s incentives to sue? On the one hand, there is no doubt that
without broad-scope claim preclusion the chance of endless litigation is
greater, and therefore an argument can be made that, without claim
preclusion, the plaintiff may have an incentive to sue the defendant again
and again. On the other hand, splitting a cause of action may provide a
strong incentive for a plaintiff to sue for all the potential claims and
remedies that can be included in one cause of action. This is because the
plaintiff knows that, if he or she fails to include any part of a demand or
cause of action in the first action, the plaintiff cannot bring another action
to claim the omitted part after judgment has been pronounced.
At the same time, under a more flexible system that allows a cause of
action to be split, the plaintiff can pursue his or her claims in stages using
legitimate strategic considerations and is therefore not forced to press all
claims to the utmost, as would be the case under the common law system.
At a particular stage in the dispute, the plaintiff may be interested only in
one claim or remedy but, because of claim preclusion, he or she is forced to
sue for all potential claims and remedies. If the plaintiff were permitted to
sue initially for only a portion of the remedies, without the risk of estoppel
looming over the other remedies, later he or she may forgo the other
remedies or these may become irrelevant with time.
An Israeli Supreme Court judgment illustrates a typical case in which
the strategic interest of the plaintiff is to not sue immediately for all the

132. In another article I challenged the traditional assumption that the rule against splitting a single
claim/cause of action increases efficiency by introducing some economic and behavioral effects of the
rule. See Yuval Sinai, The Downside of Preclusion: Some Behavioral and Economic Effects of Cause of
Action Estoppel in Civil Actions, 56 MCGILL L. J. (forthcoming 2011). The article discusses the
problematic incentives of litigating parties under the current Anglo-American rule of claim preclusion,
and its harmful effects on the conduct and cost of litigation, and on the chance of reaching a settlement.
Some of the aspects mentioned in brief in II.B.3 of the present article are further developed in The
Downside of Preclusion. See also JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 687 (noting disadvantages).
133. See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, An Examination Before and Behind the 'Entire Controversy'
Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 8, 7 (1966); Robert A. Erichson, Of Horror Stories and Happy Endings: The
Rise and the Fall of Preclusion-Based Compulsory Party Joinder Under the New Jersey Entire
Controversy Doctrine, 9 SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 757 (1999).
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remedies but to retain the option to sue for other remedies at a later date.134
The Stefania Hotel case involved a breach of contract that obliged a
company to purchase land and build a structure on it. The plaintiff wanted
to split his claims so that in the first stage he could claim only
enforcement/imposition, and at a later stage he could sue for other remedies
such as compensation for the damages incurred because of the breach of
contract. Justice Haim Herman Cohn stated
[i]n this case we are dealing with a large and expensive object. It is
possible that if the plaintiff wins and obtains an order to enforce the
contract he accomplishes all his business objectives and will no longer
be interested in compensation for damages because his damages could
be repaid by his profits. If he lost and the court decided that the
contract is not binding, he may decide to avoid spending more money
on a second lawsuit for damages caused by the breach of the contract.
And if the court dismissed the first lawsuit for enforcement although
the contract was binding, there is no reason why he cannot sue later for
compensation for damages.135

In this case, the Israeli court legitimized the plaintiff’s strategic
considerations.136 The plaintiff’s strategic considerations are also relevant
when there has been a long relationship between the litigants as, for
example, between a supplier and a large customer. In this type of situation,
the damaged party is not likely to want to sue its business partner for all the
remedies that may flow from one cause of action because it wants to
continue the relationship. Instead, the party may want to claim one remedy
and reserve the option to sue later for the other remedies. Applying claim
preclusion in such cases would force the litigants into a broad legal
battlefront that would probably damage their future relations, which is
against the interests of the litigants and of the public. Indeed, the public
interest and that of the litigants is best served by allowing the plaintiff to
split the cause of action in such cases. The court should allow the plaintiff
to split the cause of action in such cases ex ante (when requested by the
plaintiff at the beginning of the proceedings) or even ex post (when it was
not requested before).

134. In the non-religious Israeli law the common law broad-scope RJ concept usually applies. See
HARNON, supra note 14.
135. CA 329/73 Stafania Hotel Ltd. v. Miller 28(1) PD 19, 20 [1980] (translated from Hebrew by
the author). For a discussion of the effects of this theory on Israeli law, see Benjamin Rotenberg,
Splitting Remedies, (Hebrew) 16 MISHPATIM 390, 397 (1987) (Isr.).
136. See ISR. R. CIV. P. 45 (1984) (stating that the legal basis of the decision is the court's authority
to allow splitting the remedies flowing from one cause of action).
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The theory of mediation illustrates how the process of determining
which issues are included in a legal process—and in what order they are
included—greatly affects outcomes.137 Many mediators recommend
discussing the less problematic issues in the beginning and leaving the
more emotional and intensely disputed issues for a later stage, or perhaps
not addressing them at all.138 This settlement strategy helps establish a
more congenial atmosphere in which the parties are more cooperative and
have a greater chance of reaching a settlement. Therefore, the mediator
steers the discussion toward those issues that are most likely to be relevant
to finding a solution or a settlement.139 By contrast, the rules of claim
preclusion act as major obstacles to achieving a desirable behavior
modification model of litigation and to reaching a settlement.140 This does
not mean, however, that the court should always allow claims to be split. As
shown in Part IV.A.6 infra, in Jewish law the court should not permit the
plaintiff to split his or her claims if the judge believes that the plaintiff is
dishonest or that the plaintiff wants to harass the defendant one claim at a
time in order to harm the defendant. This procedure makes sense because in
such a case the plaintiff has no legitimate reason for splitting one cause of
action, for the claim does not contribute to the behavior modification of
litigation, which should be a major consideration in allowing a claim to be
split. These considerations help explain the need for a more balanced
model that would replace the contemporary broad-scope common law
model of RJ. Limiting the scope of RJ would provide a balanced model
between the interests of efficiency of judicial proceeding and the behavior
modification of litigation.

137. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION 67 (1994).
See also Susan Silbey & Sally E. Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL’Y 1, 7 (1986).
138. For example, studies on divorce disputes show that mediators have a tendency not to discuss
issues concerning intimate relations between spouses, such as trust and self-evaluation, although these
issues have been raised by the parties. The mediators preferred to concentrate on factual issues, such as
money, property, and child custody rather than dealing with the spouses' private relations. See BARUCH
BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 137, at 67 (citing WILLIAM A. DONOHUE, COMMUNICATION, MARITAL
DISPUTE AND DIVORCE MEDIATION 160-64 (1991)). For another approach, see Silbey & Merry, supra
note 137, at 16-17.
139. See James A. Wall & Dale E. Rude, Judicial Mediation: Techniques, Strategies and
Situational Effects, 41 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 44, 53 (1985).
140. On the other hand, it may be argued that without RJ the litigants might pursue endless
litigation rather than a settlement. But this argument is not so convincing, because, as mentioned above,
the judge should have the authority to prevent the plaintiff from splitting claims when doing so does not
contribute to a behavior modification model of litigation. For analyses of the effects of the rule against
splitting a cause of action on the chances of reaching a settlement see Sinai, supra note 132.
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b. Economic Efficiency
Many scholars are increasingly using economic models to analyze
litigation outcomes.141 Indeed, the possibility that a given trial outcome has
preclusive effects on future litigation significantly influences the outcome
of negotiations142 and is relevant to the question of settlement extortion.143
Some scholars argue in favor of broad-scope preclusion:
If two trials would produce a large overlap of issues or evidence, it is
wasteful to society and harassing to the adversary to have more than
one trial. This will often be the case even when the evidence and issues
are not identical. Consider the wastefulness of trying in separate
actions the alternative theories of breach of express contract to pay for
goods or services and breach of an implied undertaking to pay the
reasonable value of the same items.144

But, as illustrated above, insisting on including all factually distinct
claims in one action has some disadvantages, some of which significantly
affect cost efficiency for both the litigants and the courts. Preclusion is
likely to force parties to litigate their potential claims to the utmost and thus
increase the costs of litigation. But if the plaintiff were permitted to sue
first for only a portion of the remedies without the risk of estoppel, suing
for the other remedies might be unnecessary in the end. In the cases I
described in the previous section, it is in the public’s interest to allow the
plaintiff to split the cause of action in order to maximize the efficient
operation of the courts and to reduce costs for both the litigating parties and
for the courts. Claim preclusion is also likely to cause parties to include
possible claims that they may be unwilling to forgo but also hesitant to
press,145 which can also result in increased costs of litigation. Casad and
Clermont clarified this issue as follows:
The simplistic approach is to assume that res judicata, at least if
effortlessly applied, always saves costs by foreclosing additional

141. It has been noted that none of the models so far incorporate the effects of preclusion. Note,
Exposing the Extortion Gap: An Economic Analysis of the Rules of Collateral Estoppel, 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1940, 1942-43, n.17 (1992) [hereinafter Exposing the Extortion Gap]. See also, Steven Shavell,
Suit, Settlement and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of
Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under
Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 (1984).
142. See, e.g., Exposing the Extortion Gap, supra note 141, at 1953-55.
143. See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
437 (1988).
144. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 686-87. See also VESTAL, supra note 8, at 103. For efficiency
factors favoring preclusion, see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 31-33.
145. JAMES ET AL., supra note 2, at 687.
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litigation. But a moment’s thought reveals countervailing effects. A
broad rule of claim preclusion will encourage a claimant to put
everything before the first court, while a narrower rule might result in
unasserted matters never having to be litigated at all. A broad rule of
issue preclusion, which establishes an outcome for all purposes in all
contexts for all times, may produce litigation to the death over that
issue in the initial action. Obviously, every res judicata problem
requires the weighting of net savings: adding up the savings of avoided
later litigation, but subtracting the costs of fighting over res judicata’s
application and also the costs of intensified initial litigation.146

Furthermore, the traditional view that “it is wasteful to society and
harassing to the adversary to have more than one trial,”147 and similar
justifications of RJ address this rule from an ex post point of view, without
considering the effects of the rules on the parties’ potential incentives
before a dispute has even been filed. Some scholars argue that procedural
rules are often examined from a narrow perspective, focusing on the effect
of the rules ex post.148 In an effort to strike a proper balance between justice
and efficiency, courts tend to ignore the ex ante effects of procedural rules
before their actual application. The ex ante examination of legal rules is a
fundamental concept of the economic approach to the analysis of law,
designed to give jurists an insight into the effects of legal rules on the
behavior of the parties.149
Ex ante analysis of the rules of cause of action/issue preclusion reveals
the effect of these rules on the trial costs of the parties.150 It appears that the
broader the scope of the claim preclusion, the higher the costs of a
particular procedure. First, under broad-scope claim preclusion, it is
necessary to claim all remedies in one cause of action to prevent their
estoppel in the future. Second, it is necessary to expend much greater effort
on each cause of action because the consequences of the decision have farreaching effects on future action.
These observations lead to the conclusion that, under broad-scope
claim preclusion, fewer claims are submitted to the court but the costs of

146. CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 34.
147. See supra text accompanying note 144.
148. Alon Klement & Roy Shapira, Justice and Efficiency in Civil Procedure—A Novel Interpretive
Approach, 7 LAW & BUS. 75 (2007) (Isr.).
149. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVEL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1 (2004):
Under the economic approach to the analysis of law, two basic types of questions about legal
rules are addressed. The first type is descriptive, concerning the effects of legal rule . . . .
Given the characterization of individuals' behavior as rational, the influence of legal rules on
behavior can be ascertained.
150. Klement & Shapira, supra note 148, at 102. For an analysis of the influences of issue
preclusion, see Exposing the Extortion Gap, supra note 141.
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every claim is much higher than that of an average claim under a narrow RJ
policy, which can have an adverse effect on access to judicial
decisionmaking.151 Ex ante considerations of broad-scope claim preclusion
can prevent plaintiffs from submitting their claims to court because of the
need to claim all remedies in one cause of action, which could increase trial
costs to a level that may prevent them from submitting their claims at all.
C. Correctness and Revisionism
1. The Importance of Preventing Erroneous Decisions
There is a tension between finality and revisionism.152 Finality is an
expression of the desire to achieve an end. The motivation for revising
decisions, as suggested by Resnik, includes “the hopes of correcting error;
of altering outcomes based upon changed circumstances; of imbuing some
decisions with more meaning by having them made repeatedly and
sometimes by prestigious actors; of giving individuals a sense of having
been fully and fairly heard.”153
Error correction is one reason for revision, although a series of
justifications have been offered for preferring the views of a second
decisionmaker to those of the trial judge.154 Kenneth Scott discussed the
separate implications of the two models discussed above for appeals and
due process.155 Scott analyzed the proposition that the right of appealing a
court ruling is never constitutionally guaranteed or essential for the conflict
resolution model:156
In terms of a mechanism for settling disputes, one hearing is enough to
do the job, and it is all that arbitration and grievance procedures
customarily afford. No doubt the loser would like another chance, but
that is endlessly true. Rather than the outcome, it is the existence of a
form of impartial arbitrament that is essential.157

Nevertheless, when assessing the issue of appeals from the point of
view of the behavior modification model, the effects of error are a concern

151. The discussion, supra Part II.B.2, focused on the ex post effects of broad-scope claim
preclusion on the constitutional right to access to judicial decisionmaking—the prohibition of initiating
further claims on behalf of the first cause of action. The above analysis draws attention to a more
harmful effect on the access to judicial decisionmaking.
152. Resnik, supra note 102, at 854-55.
153. Id. at 855.
154. See, e.g., id. at 855-57; Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1995); Scott, supra note 95, at 945-47.
155. Scott, supra note 95, at 945.
156. Id. at 946.
157. Id.
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because this model proposes to affect behavior by imposing costs
correctly.158 The function of the appeal is primarily to reduce the incidence
of legal errors.159 According to Scott, the behavior modification model
proposes “that a discretionary channel of review be open for cases where
the costs of legal error are high. Such a position explicitly reorganizes the
lawmaking function of appellate courts and would require as a matter of
due process that they be given the discretion to grant review in order to
prevent the erroneous imposition of substantial costs or penalties.”160
Indeed, applying RJ rules that prevent a trial-level tribunal from
reconsidering its decisions does not help prevent erroneous decisions and is
therefore not desirable from the perspective of the behavior modification
model. As Casad and Clermont noted, RJ is not an end in itself but merely
plays a role in a larger system of justice.161 Some major fairness factors
weigh against the rules of RJ, among them “the fair-outcome value of
deciding on the merits rather than on technicalities and of refusing to
curtail society’s search for truth.”162
2. Producing an Efficient Judicial Process of Error Correction
a. The Error Costs of Not Seeking Truth
From the perspective of cost efficiency, as well, some factors weigh
against the rule of preclusion, including “the error costs of not seeking truth
by reaching the merits and trying to correct any initial mistake,”163 as
explained by Casad and Clermont:
Because legal rules have goals—be they the maximization of economic
value or other substantive goals—and because realization of modern
goals requires accurate application of the law to the facts, mistakes by
the judicial branch distance society from those goals. Judicial mistakes
thus impose social costs, and the procedural system should strive to
reduce those costs. Procedure should frown on any impediment to
correcting mistake.164

Some scholars have argued, however, that the presence of errors in a
prior judgment is irrelevant to RJ.165 A typical economic analysis of RJ is

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id.
Id. at 947.
Id.
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 33.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
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presented by Judge Richard Posner, who justifies the doctrine in modern
economic terms.166 According to Posner, there is less justification for RJ
“than there would be for a direct limitation on the amount that parties might
spend on a law suit. The first loss should discourage the plaintiff from
expending additional resources in trying to vindicate his claim; legal
prohibition seems largely superfluous.”167 But, in the end, Posner finds an
economic justification for RJ because of the direct costs incurred by the
legal system if the court is to address the same matter again. Posner argues
that, because a second round of litigation is unlikely to be more accurate,
re-adjudication will not avoid error costs; that is, the costs caused to social
goal maximization by mistaken outcomes. Given the increased direct costs
of relitigation on the one hand and neutral error costs on the other,
proponents of economic efficiency in the law should generally favor RJ.
Nevertheless, I agree with Casad and Clermont that “although
commentators frequently observe that the existence of error in the prior
judgment is irrelevant to res judicata, this is not really true.”168 The authors
argue further that “it is certainly not true that error is irrelevant to the
formulation of res judicata. In shaping the rules and exceptions of res
judicata law, the lawmakers must remain aware that the possibility of error
is relevant to efficiency, as well as fairness.”169
b. Providing Information about the Occurrence of Error
Arguing in favor of RJ, Posner asks why we assume that readjudication by the trial judge or by another tribunal will be more accurate
than adjudication by the first tribunal. The relevance of this question
extends beyond the rules of RJ, and a similar question is frequently asked
about the appeals process: why do we assume that the decision of the
appeals court is more correct than that of the trial judge?
The answer to the last question, in my opinion, should lead to a search
for an appropriate explanation of the general need to re-adjudicate and
should lead to a position that favors non-preclusion. A persuasive
explanation of the appeals process of error correction was provided by
Steven Shavell, who suggested that, if litigants possessed information that
errors had been made, and if the appeals courts could frequently verify the
information, litigants might file appeals only when errors were likely to

166.
167.
168.
169.

See Posner, supra note 51, at 444-45.
Id. at 445.
CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 8, at 34.
Id.
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have been made but not otherwise.170 In Shavell’s opinion, under these
circumstances, the appeals process could achieve error correction at low
cost because the legal system would be burdened with reconsidering only
in the subset of cases in which errors were more likely to have been made.
In other words, the appeals process might enable society to take advantage
of information that litigants have about erroneous decisions and thereby
reduce the incidence of mistakes at a low cost.171
What causes errors in the court, and why are they not corrected at the
trial but rather in the appeals court? These questions are more poignant in
the case of clear mistakes made by the trial court. One of the explanations,
given by Shavell, is as follows:
Although it is true that when courts do make fairly clear mistakes,
these will often be pointed out by litigants at trial and corrected there,
that will not always be the outcome. On the one hand, a litigant may
not have a chance to assert an error at trial: the error may be made in
the court’s decision itself—when it is too late to make an objection. On
the other hand, an error that is asserted at trial may not be corrected
there despite the fact that it would be seen on reflection as a clear
mistake; to appreciate that an error has occurred may require
deliberation that the press of trial does not allow. After trial, however,
the losing litigant has both the time and a strong incentive to review his
objections to single out those with merit.172 Observe as well that the
post-trial opportunity of litigants to inspect the record provides us a
reason why litigants may discover trial court errors even though their
general legal expertise may be inferior to the courts.173

In my opinion, these observations support a non-preclusion approach
because granting the parties the option to relitigate in the trial court can
contribute significantly to the process of error correction. Relitigation in the
trial court can allow litigants to take advantage of information that they
gain about erroneous decisions, reducing the incidence of mistakes at an
even lower cost than that of error correction by the appellate court. Unlike
the appellate judge, who learns the factual and legal grounds of the case on
appeal, the trial judge is familiar with the details of the case, and the only

170. Shavell, supra note 154, at 381. Shavell also notes that this outcome may be fostered by
charging a fee for bringing an appeal to discourage appeals when decisions are likely to have been
correct.
171. Id. at 382.
172. “Note that during the trial, before knowing the outcome, the litigant's incentive to discover
errors is lower.” Id. at 414, n.57.
173. Id. at 414. According to another explanation, "one presumes that trial courts will occasionally
make even fairly clear mistakes owing to a variety of factors: the inexperience of some judges, the
pressure of time, and the fact that the courts are responsible for applying a vast body of law." Id.
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new information introduced would be new evidence or the litigant’s
argument that the judge’s decision was incorrect. After trial, the defeated
litigant has both the time and the incentive to review his objections to the
trial court decision. At this stage it could be efficient to introduce these
objections to the trial judge (often this is the first time the judge is notified
that he or she may have made a mistake) and give him or her the
opportunity to reconsider his initial decision. If the trial judge were
persuaded by the objections he or she could reverse the original decision
and issue a new and hopefully more correct one.
The probability that a second, revised decision by the trial judge
would be more correct than the first one is often higher than the probability
that the decision given by the appellate court is more correct than the initial
decision. Judges—and people in general—do not easily admit that they
have made an incorrect decision. Therefore, if the trial judge reaches the
conclusion that he or she should reverse a decision, there is a good chance
that his or her revised decision is more accurate than the first one.174 This
assumption does not apply to appellate judges, who were not involved in
the initial process, and therefore the probability that their decision will be
more correct than the initial one is lower than the probability of the trial
judge rendering a more correct decision.
c. Judicial Incentive to Avoid Reversal
Another consideration that supports giving the trial judge the option of
reconsidering his decision has to do with the judges’ incentives to avoid
reversal of their decisions. One of the justifications for the appellate
process is its effect on errors made at trial because of trial judges’ fear of
reversal.175 Judges fear reversal because it may affect their reputation, their
salaries, or the likelihood of promotion.176 Therefore, the appeals process
can lead indirectly to increased trial court accuracy by encouraging judges
to expend greater effort at trial. In this case, error prevention occurs
without a formal appeal, during the initial trial, when litigants raise

174. At the same time, it is possible to argue that the trial judge is not likely to admit that he made a
mistake, unlike the appellate judge who often finds the mistakes of the trial court. But this argument is
not always true because the trial judge has a strong incentive to avoid reversal, which encourages him to
render accurate decisions that will not be reversed on appeal.
175. SHAVELL, supra note 154, at 390-91.
176. Many articles address the incentives of judges. See, e.g., Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin,
Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1980); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and
Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107 (1983); Mark A. Cohen, The Motives of Judges: Empirical
Evidence from Antitrust Sentencing, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 13 (1992); Richard A. Posner, What Do
Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1
(1993).
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objections to what they see as mistakes, in what Shavell calls “a system of
appeal in the small.”177
A non-preclusion legal system that permits the trial judge to
reconsider his or her decision after the trial and to revise it if he or she finds
the first decision to be incorrect can enhance significantly the likelihood
that the trial judge will render accurate decisions. It is likely that the trial
judge would use the opportunity to correct his or her mistakes after the trial
to prevent an undesirable reversal—from his or her point of view—by the
appellate court. And, if the error is not corrected by the trial judge, the error
may still be corrected by the appellate court.
d. The Distinction between Law and Facts
The U.S. legal system, like other common law legal systems,178
distinguishes between law and facts in separating issues that can be
appealed from those that cannot.179 In general, an appeal can be lodged on
the grounds of error of law or error in applying the law to the facts. But
ordinarily, an appeal cannot be lodged on the grounds that the discovered
facts are incorrect, with some notable exceptions.
According to Shavell’s rationale for the distinction between law and
facts, when an error concerns rules and their application,
it is possible in the ideal both for a litigant to recognize the error and
for an appeals court to verify its occurrence . . . . By contrast to a claim
that a rule was violated or misapplied, a claim that the found facts are
themselves incorrect would often be difficult for an appeals court to
corroborate, even though a litigant might know that the found facts
were in error . . . . How could an appeals court confirm a claim by the
defendant that the testimony is false? . . . For an appeals court to assess
the validity of the witness’s testimony, the appeals court would often
have to engage in costly reexamination of the trial court record and
perhaps hear live testimony. . . .180

But if cases are relitigated in the trial courts (as in Jewish law), factual
issues can be reconsidered economically in the trial court because this court
has already examined the main factual aspects of the case and, unlike the
appellate court, the trial court does not need to learn all the details of the
case to reconsider its initial decision.

177. SHAVELL, supra note 154, at 426.
178. For restrictions on the scope of appeal in the English legal system, see, for example,
ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 492-98.
179. The scope of the appellate review is discussed by JAMES, supra note 2, at 766-75.
180. Shavell, supra note 154, at 418-19.
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III. SECOND MODEL: NARROW-SCOPE RES JUDICATA
The German–Continental civil-law system181 demonstrates an
interesting and narrower version of RJ. In this part, I argue that, although
the German model appears to be superior to the broader common law rules
of RJ, its cost efficiency is questionable.
A. Overview of the German–Continental Rules of RJ
The German model of RJ182 is in many regards similar to the doctrine
of RJ in Anglo-American jurisprudence, but “the scope and effect of the
doctrine are somewhat different.”183 In the German civil system, only a
judgment that is not “subject to further appeal (formelle Rechtskraft) stands
as the conclusive adjudication” and is subject to RJ.184 The rationale for this
system is simple. Wherever there is a multilevel apparatus of justice, as in
the continental system in general185 and the German civil justice system in
particular,186 original decisions can be treated as tentative and decision
stability is needed only after the highest authority has spoken.187According
to one interpretation of the German doctrine, the goal of RJ is to “guarantee
certainty in litigation and to preclude repeated relitigation of matters
already litigated and decided.”188
In addition, “German civil procedure does not recognize the concept
of claim preclusion in the broad sense as is the case in common law
countries.”189 The basic rule is that a judgment binds the parties with
respect to the subject matter of claims actually asserted and decided, but
parties are not bound in actual or potential claims not submitted for
adjudication.190 The concept of claim preclusion in the broader AngloAmerican version does not apply in German civil procedure, for the

181. I prefer to focus on Germany rather than other civil law systems because many jurists value
this legal system and consider it a fine representative of the European–Continental system of civil
procedure, valued more highly than the U.S. common law civil procedure. See e.g., John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage In Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823 (1985). See also Benjamin Kaplan,
Arthur T. von Mehren, & Rudolf Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure II, 71 HARV. L. REV.
1443, 1443-72 (1958).
182. For the German rules of RJ, see PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF STÜRNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE
355-66 (2004).
183. Id. at 355 n.245.
184. Id. at 355-56.
185. See DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 28-39.
186. For the German appellate justice, see MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 367-418.
187. DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 145.
188. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 355.
189. Id. at 357.
190. Id.
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binding effect extends only to claims that could have been raised or might
have arisen from the same occurrence.191 Whenever the issue of RJ is
raised, the court examines and compares formal claims for relief and
factual elements of the current claim with those of the decided case, and the
new case will not be dismissed if the court finds a difference in the
operative facts.192
In Part II, I argued for the desirability of narrow-scope RJ. In this
sense, the German model of RJ is superior to the common law model, but it
poses some difficulties from the perspective of cost-efficiency, as discussed
below.
The narrow concept of RJ in the German system can be explained in
light of one of the main features of the Continental legal process: the
implementation of government policy. According to Damaska, in a legal
process designed to implement government policy, such as in Continental
or socialist/communist jurisdictions,193 the need to apply a doctrine of RJ is
not great194 because the stability of judgments is a matter of low priority
and because all judgments are rendered provisionally. In these jurisdictions,
“it is difficult to justify any obstacle to reversal and reconsideration” of
errors in judgment, both factual and legal.195 Nevertheless, Damaska
stressed that “even the most energetic activist governments discover at
some point that some stability and repose is needed . . . . Limited
concessions to stability are made, and in their wake, some degree of
decisional rigidity—a form of res judicata—emerges.”196
Another aspect of the Continental concept of RJ concerns the initiator
of an RJ claim. We have seen that, in the common law approach, the court
does not acknowledge the doctrine of RJ on its own initiative.197 By
contrast, the idea that RJ primarily concerns the public interest has
prompted many Continental countries to adopt an absolute principle of RJ,
requiring the court to take into account a former judgment on its own
initiative. In several European countries, explicit statutory provisions can
be found to this effect.198
191. Id.
192. Id. at 358.
193. In Soviet legal systems the revision of judgments was not limited for a long period.
DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 179.
194. Id. at 178-79.
195. Id. at 178.
196. Id. at 179.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 69-72.
198. Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of Judgment as Res Judicata in Continental and AngloAmerican Law, 39 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1940); see also MAURO CAPPELLETI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 254-55 (1965).
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B. Inefficient Judicial Process of Error Correction
Despite the desirable narrow scope of its RJ rules, the German
process of error correction is not efficient. German civil justice “has
traditionally offered numerous appellate remedies . . . to parties aggrieved
by judicial findings . . . at almost any stage of the proceedings.” In almost
every case appellants have at least two potential levels of resort beyond the
first-instance local court or state district court proceeding.199
A party dissatisfied with the decision of a court of first instance is
generally entitled to trial de novo in the court of second instance. Only the
third court to consider a civil case would defer to the prior decision.200 The
“hierarchical” process reflects characteristics rooted in the Continental
tradition,201 as explained by Damaska: “Once a lower official has spoken,
the procedural episode conducted before him comes to an end (functum
officio): corrections of his decision, if needed, can now be made only by
higher-ups in the organization. Requests to reconsider addressed to the
initial adjudicator are therefore misplaced.”202 Even if new evidence is
discovered while an appeal is pending, the evidence must be submitted to
the reviewing authority rather than to the original adjudicator.203
These features of the Continental and German appellate processes
produce inefficient error correction. Indeed, some reform proposals in
Germany are “designed to reduce the appellate process and its consequent
costs and delays.”204 But the reforms in appellate procedure enacted in July
2001 were relatively modest and did not seriously abbreviate or curtail
appellate options in most civil cases.205
By contrast, a jurisdiction that allows the trial judge to reconsider and
revise his or her decision if needed contributes significantly to an efficient
judicial process of error correction. But German civil procedure, similar to
that in other Continental legal systems, does not provide for a meaningful
process of relitigation by the trial court. Only in rare cases does German
civil procedure provide for special proceedings where a court may reopen
its own civil judgment after all the appellate measures have been
exhausted.206 The grounds for reopening are described by Murray and

199. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 367.
200. For the German appellate system, see generally id. at 367-417.
201. The coordinate style also reflects “features of the legal process in the English tradition,” as
explained by DAMASKA, supra note 82, at 47.
202. Id. at 49.
203. Id.
204. MURRAY & STÜRNER, supra note 182, at 369.
205. Id.
206. See generally id. at 362-65.
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Stürner as a “particularly serious lack of correct procedure” or an “obvious
disintegration of the correctness of the judgments.”207 These grounds are
too narrow. From the perspective of cost efficiency, granting the parties
broader options of relitigation in the trial court would be more appropriate
and would contribute significantly to the process of error correction.
IV. THIRD MODEL: NON-FINALITY OF JUDGMENTS
A. Overview of the Jewish Law Model
1. Rejection of the Doctrine of RJ
Jewish law208 rejects many—but not all—of the elements of RJ and
adopts an entirely different approach.209 By its nature, in which discovery
of the truth is an element of justice to which all else is subordinated, Jewish
law cannot accept an approach whereby a judgment is irreversible even
when incorrect.210 Jewish law uses a unique concept of non-finality of
judgments.211 In principle, a litigant can usually reverse a judicial decision
after the judgment has been handed down. Judgments can be reopened for
reconsideration based on an error in the judgment or on newly discovered
evidence. Nevertheless, judgments are considered binding unless they are
reversed by the trial court or an appellate tribunal.212 Rabbinical sources
207. Id. at 362.
208. For a general overview of some of the relevant sources in Jewish Law, see generally NAHUM
RAKOVER, THE SOURCES OF JEWISH LAW (1994) and 3 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY,
SOURCES, PRINCIPLES (1994). In general, “the principles and rules of Jewish law are based on the
Scripture.” RAKOVER, supra, at 15. Some rules are mentioned quite explicitly, but others are only
implied. All are elucidated in the teachings of the Tanna’im and Amora’im—the rabbis of the Mishnah
and Talmud—and presented systematically in the codes. “The Mishnah is the first topical compilation
of the Oral Law (Torah shebe’al peh) . . . completed around 200 C.E.” Id. at 33. “For some 300 years—
approximately 200-500 C.E—after the redaction of the Mishnah, Jewish scholarship was devoted
primarily to the study, clarification, and application of the Mishnah.” Id. at 43. The scholars of this
period, known as the Amora’im, wrote the Talmud. “Halakhic literature after the period of the Talmud
includes . . . codes, halakhic glosses, response literature, and court decisions.” Id. at 61. The main codes
are the Maimonides code Mishneh Torah (1135-1204), Tur (1270-1340), and Shulhan Arukh (14881575), which are universally accepted as the authoritative code of Jewish law. Thus, over many
generations, a comprehensive legal system has developed based on the Scripture as elaborated by
exegesis and amplification.
209. A preference for this approach over that of English law is found in an opinion by Israeli
Supreme Court Justice Berenson, in which he states that “it would be preferable to make recourse to
this rule [SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20] that is better suited to the conditions in Israel than to
be loyal to the severe, rigid English rule.” CA 395/60 Amrani v. Attorney General, 15 PD 594, 602
(1960).
210. See Chigier, supra note 19, at 129-30; ELIAV SHOCHETMAN, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JEWISH
LAW 423-41 (1988).
211. See generally SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210.
212. See id. at 441.
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indicate that, if the court acquits the defendant in a suit and the plaintiff
lodges a claim against the defendant in another court, the defendant need
not litigate or answer the plaintiff’s complaint in the second court; in
addition, the second court is not permitted to hear the plaintiff because the
defendant has already been acquitted by the first court.213 Thus, some RJlike principles can be found in Jewish law, but this role is minimal. In the
Jewish legal system, a judgment is in principle subject to revision,214
normally by the court that issued it. Courts revise judgments if new
evidence comes to light undermining the facts on which the judgment was
based, provided that the party seeking to adduce the new evidence is not
debarred from so doing.215 Judgments are also subject to revision for errors
in the application of the law, as discussed in Part IV.4 infra.
2. Contemporary Application in Rabbinical Courts in the State of
Israel
The ancient Jewish law concept of non-finality of judgments also
applies in the contemporary system of Israeli rabbinical courts authorized
in the modern State of Israel, which is a rather unusual legal system. In
Israel, alongside the regular civil courts operates a separate system of
religious courts that adjudicate matters of personal status involving
members of the religious communities.216 For Jews in Israel, matters of
marriage and divorce are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the rabbinical
courts, which rule according to Jewish family law.217 The procedural rules
of the rabbinical courts, which also deal with the issue of RJ, are somewhat
modern in form. The promulgation of the Rules of Procedure for the
rabbinical courts in the State of Israel marked the first attempt in the history
of Jewish law to provide a modern compilation of the rules of procedure. In
1943, the Council of the Chief Rabbinate published the Rules of Procedure,
based largely on the Jewish law classic literature.218 The rules have been

213. See The RESPONSA at the end of HAZEH HATNUFAH, § 40, as mentioned in BEIT YOSEF,
Hoshen Mishpat, § 12, and also accepted by RAMA in DARCHEI MOSHE, Hoshen Mishpat, 20:2.
214. See Cohn & Sinai, supra note 18, at 437-38, 445.
215. MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 3:8; SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1.
216. See, e.g., Menashe Shava, The Rabbinical Courts in Israel: Jurisdiction Over Non-Jews?, 27
J. CHURCH & ST. 99 (1985), reprinted in MENASHE SHAVA, SELECTED TOPICS IN FAMILY AND PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (2000).
217. Section 1 of the RABBINICAL COURTS JURISDICTION (MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE) LAW OF
1953, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 (1952-1953), reads as follows: “Matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in
Israel, being nationals or residents of the state, shall be under the exclusive jurisdiction of Rabbinical
Courts,” which rule according to the Jewish family law. Many Jews in the Diaspora voluntarily avail
themselves of the services of private rabbinical courts.
218. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 11-12.
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revised several times over the years. The last revision was in 1993, and all
references in the present article are to those rules.
The modern rules of procedure for the rabbinical courts provide for an
option to reverse a judgment.219
3. Dilemma Between the Truth and Ending the Dispute
Jewish law has always taken into account the difficulty in allowing
endless litigation between the same parties and the dilemma created by the
conflicting policies: justice and efficiency.220 On the one hand, justice
demands that a case be reconsidered when the losing party claims to have
new evidence establishing the truth. On the other hand, a legal system
cannot allow a dispute to continue indefinitely. The Mishnah (the first
topical compilation of the oral law, completed around 200 C.E.) records
two diverging opinions of sages that reflect the tension between the two
opposing policies.221 The major principle mentioned in the beginning of the
Mishnah states that “[a]ny time a party can produce any proof, the court
may reverse the verdict.” This statement rejects the doctrine of RJ entirely.
But a limitation follows: “If the court said to him to bring all the evidence
within thirty days, and he brought it after thirty days, the verdict may not
be reversed.”
According to this opinion, a dispute can end by setting a time limit for
producing new evidence, after which time the verdict cannot be reversed.
But this opinion was forcefully rejected by Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel, the
President of the Sanhedrin, who demanded that justice be done: “What
should he do when he did not find the evidence within thirty days but found
it afterwards?”
According to Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel’s approach, when a conflict
between the public interest of finality of judgments and the commitment of
rendering a true judgment based on true facts arises, the latter policy
prevails. This strong argument against injustice was accepted by the Jewish
law codifiers, and the 30-day limitation was withdrawn.222 But the halakhic
codifiers accepted another limitation. If a court asks a litigant whether he or
she has other witnesses or evidence, and the litigant replies that he or she
has no more witnesses or evidence, the litigant is not permitted to bring

219. See id. at 432-33. Chapter 14 of these rules contains the procedure for reversing a judgment
and reconsidering a case.
220. Chigier, supra note 19, at 129.
221. See MISHNAH, Sanhedrin 3:8. Quotations that follws refer to the Sanhedrin unless otherwise
indicated.
222. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1.
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them later to reverse the judgment.223 Rabbi Shimon Ben Gamliel objected
to this limitation as well, but the majority decided against him,224 realizing
that sooner or later every dispute must be stopped somehow. Nevertheless,
the majority could not ignore the demand for justice, and they permitted
litigants to present new evidence in some cases, even after the litigants had
stated that they had no more witnesses or evidence, because the court found
that they did not lie.225 Note that these rules apply both to the plaintiff and
the defendant.226
The rules accepted by the Jewish codifiers indicate that the right to
revise a judgment is not time-limited.227 This approach was adopted in the
modern procedural rules of the Israeli rabbinical courts. According to
Section One of Rule 129, a litigant has the right—at any time—to request
that the court that adjudicated his or her case reconsider it. This rule, which
does not set a deadline, is problematic, and it certainly does not contribute
to the parties’ sense of security or to the legal system’s stability, for the
possibility of endless litigation is always present. This problem can be
solved, however, by adopting the minority opinion listed in the Jerusalem
Talmud, whereby the right to request that the trial court reconsider a case
has a deadline: the actual execution of the judgment by the parties.228 In
other words, the trial court may reconsider a case before the judgment has
been carried out, but not after, as, for example, after one party has paid the
other according to the judgment because this is the final stage of fulfillment
of the judgment.229 At this stage, the party that received the money is
already counting on it; if the other party were allowed to reopen the case, it
could damage the party that received the money. Although this opinion,
which contains some elements of the RJ concept, was not accepted by the
mainstream of Jewish law codifiers,230 Jewish law could in principle

223. See MISHNAH, supra note 215, as accepted in SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1.
224. Id.
225. This is because when he said he has no further proof he could not have known that other
evidence existed, as for example when witnesses arrived from overseas after the trial, or if it has been
proven that the briefcase in which he kept the documents was not in his possession at the time of the
trial, etc.
226. See Chigier, supra note 19, at 131. The author noted that there may be good reason for
differentiating between the two litigants. The sense of justice in the case of the defendant is stronger
than in the case of the plaintiff, because it is the plaintiff's fault that he filed suit before ascertaining that
he had all the evidence. Furthermore, as it regards the plaintiff the doctrine of RJ may be applied for the
sake of public policy, but as it regards the defendant, it is to prevent his being harassed repeatedly by
the plaintiff. This distinction was not accepted by the halakhic codifiers, as noted above.
227. See SHULHAN ARUKH, supra note 222.
228. See JERUSALEM TALMUD, Sanhedrin 3:12.
229. See RABBI AVRAHAM YITZHAK KOOK, BEHER ELIYAHU, § 20.
230. See supra text accompanying note 222.
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recognize a clear new law (which does not exist in the contemporary
practice) that set a time limit (for example, two or three years) on the right
to request that the trial court reconsider a case, if such legislation were
enacted by the rabbinical authorities.231
4. New Evidence and New Factual and Legal Arguments
As we have seen, a rabbinical trial court may reconsider its judgment
if a litigant presents sufficiently probative evidence that was found after the
judgment was made. In order to challenge the decision, the petitioner must
show that the new evidence was not in his possession during the trial and
that he was unaware of its existence.232 This limitation was adopted by the
modern procedural rules of the Israeli rabbinical courts. Section One of
Rule 129 indicates that the litigant has the right at all times to request the
court that adjudicated his case to reconsider the case based on a new factual
argument or new evidence of which he was unaware during the original
trial. The litigant must specify in his request the details of the new
evidentiary or factual arguments he wishes to present in order to reverse the
judgment.233 The litigant must also explain why he did not present the
evidence at the original trial.234 The rabbinical court considers the request
without hearing the parties235 and may reject the request or invite the
parties for a hearing. If the court decides to hear the claim, the court can
delay enforcement of its judgment236 until it renders a final decision on the
request for reversal.237
These rules are related to another rule stating that after all claims and
evidence have been presented at the trial, the court should ask the parties
whether they have additional claims and evidence.238 According to this
rule, if the parties declare that they have no further evidence or claims, the
court will not accept further evidence or claims in the future unless the
litigant provides a good explanation for his request. Indeed, the evidentiary
stage of the trial ends only after the parties clearly answer the court’s
question and their declarations are recorded in the trial protocol.239 Note

231. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 430.
232. See RESPONSA ROSH, 13:20. Relying on sources in Jewish law, Israeli Supreme Court Justice
Kister held that new evidence cannot be introduced after a decision has been rendered if it could have
been brought earlier. CA 211/65 Attorney General v. Mazan, 19 PD 32, 43-44 [1965] (Isr.).
233. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 129, § 2. See also SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 432.
234. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 129 § 2.
235. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 130 § 1.
236. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 130 § 2.
237. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 131.
238. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 72.
239. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 432 n.49.
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that in practice, as a result of this rule, the Israeli rabbinical courts are
asked to reverse few judgments, and a litigant who declares during the trial
that he has no further evidence cannot present additional evidence later.240
There is a difference of opinion as to whether a party can challenge a
decision on the basis of new legal arguments that were not raised at trial.241
According to one view, a decision can be challenged only on the basis of
new evidence;242 however, the prevailing view appears to be that a decision
can be challenged on the basis of new legal arguments as well.243
5. Appellate Tribunals and the Right to Reverse Erroneous Judgments
Most modern legal systems contain several hierarchically organized
judicial tribunals. A litigant who is dissatisfied with a lower tribunal’s
decision can appeal the decision to a higher tribunal. The right of appeal is
based on the presumption that the lower tribunal may have erred in its
ruling. The aspiration for true justice requires (both in common law and
German–Continental systems) that the litigant be given an additional
opportunity to have his or her claims heard. By contrast, in traditional
Jewish law, the availability of an appellate tribunal is not self-evident.244
Admittedly, a rabbinical court that has erred is obligated to reexamine its
decision and correct it,245 and the litigant is entitled to return to the trial
court after receiving its decision and attempt to convince it that a mistake
has been made.246 “[T]his is clearly not a satisfactory solution,”247 and in
many cases the rabbinical court disagrees that its decision was mistaken, a
position that some litigants ascribe, “rightly or wrongly, to the
stubbornness on the part of [judges] who are unwilling to amend their
rulings.”248
The establishment of rabbinical appellate tribunals in Israel in the
twentieth century is “the result of extrinsic circumstances, such as
competition with external judicial institutions.”249 The most prominent and

240. See id. at 433 n.52.
241. See id. at 436-67.
242. Sho'el ve-Nish'al le-Rabbi Khalfon Moshe ha-Kohen, pt. 5, Hoshen Mishpat, sec. 8 (S.V.vekhen yesh le-hokhi'ah), SHULHAN ARUKH.
243. Sefer Me'irat Einayim, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1, SHULHAN ARUKH.
244. See Amichai Radzyner, Appeal, in 2 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 283-84 (2d ed. 2007).
245. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 25:1–2.
246. SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 20:1.
247. See Radzyner, supra note 244, at 283.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 284.
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influential of these tribunals is the Rabbinical Court of Appeals of the
Chief Rabbinate, established in Jerusalem in 1921.250
Either party or the trial court can take the initiative to reverse a
judgment that they believe is erroneous.251 In a legal system that includes
appellate tribunals, however, the right to request a reversal by the trial court
would be superfluous because the authority to reconsider the judgment is
already vested in the appellate court.252
In fact, the rules of procedure of the Israeli rabbinical courts specify
that if there is a suspicion that a court has erred in rendering its judgment
the court itself can take the initiative to reverse the judgment and invite the
parties to reconsider the case.253 Conversely, the parties do not have the
right to request that the trial court reverse all errors in judgments but rather
only those based on new evidence or arguments.254 Furthermore, the right
of the trial court to reverse its erroneous judgment exists only when the
case is not before the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. After the Rabbinical
Court of Appeals renders a final judgment, the trial court is not authorized
to reconsider the case255 because a rabbinical court functioning within a
legal system that includes an appellate tribunal must (by law) respect the
decision of the appellate court.256
6. Claim Preclusion
An important rabbinical authority, R. Shimeon b. Zemach Duran, the
Rashbatz, a North African rabbi of the fourteenth century, was asked about a
defendant’s demand that the plaintiff aggregate all of his claims and remedies
into one cause of action so that the plaintiff may not reopen the case later.257
In other words, the defendant was seeking an ancient version of claim
preclusion that would prevent the plaintiff from later reopening the case.
Rashbatz wrote that no legal ground existed to compel the plaintiff to
assemble all of his claims against the defendant into one cause of action.
According to Rashbatz, the plaintiff has the right to first sue based on one

250. There was intense controversy among rabbis in Israel and abroad regarding the establishment
of such a tribunal. “The main claim of its opponents was that such an institution was an innovation
which contradicted traditional halakhah.” Id.
251. See SHULHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat 17:8.
252. SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 440.
253. Israeli Rabbinical Ct. R. 128.
254. These cases cannot be examined by the appellate court, but the parties have the right to request
reversal of an erroneous judgment rendered by the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. See SHOCHETMAN,
supra note 210, at 440.
255. See id.
256. See CA 682/81 Fried v. Fried 36(2) PD 695, 698-99 [1982] (Isr.).
257. RESPONSA TASHBETZ 2:2.
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claim only and to later sue based on other claims. The plaintiff has the right
to divide one cause of action into different stages and to sue separately
based on different claims because he or she may have legitimate reasons
for doing so. Rashbatz presented some of these reasons. First, the plaintiff
may have witnesses who can appear in court readily to testify about one
claim, whereas the witnesses related to another claim may be far and
cannot appear in court immediately. In this situation it would be unjust to
prevent the plaintiff from submitting a cause of action until he can include
all of the claims. Second, the plaintiff may not want to submit all claims in
the beginning because the defendant might later admit the second claim.
Third, the plaintiff may believe that he and the defendant might be able to
compromise and reach a settlement regarding the second claim. Fourth, the
plaintiff may not at first know of all the potential claims he has against the
defendant. All of these reasons are considered sufficient for dividing one
cause of action into different claims, so that claim preclusion does not
apply in these cases. The defendant can prevent the plaintiff from splitting
the cause of action only if he can show that doing so would cause damage
to his property.258
If splitting a claim is likely to damage the defendant, the court will
sustain the defendant’s objection to dividing the cause of action. For
instance, if the plaintiff files a claim of non-ownership of land against a
defendant who has possession of the disputed land and the plaintiff asks the
court to address the issue of the land’s ownership at a later stage, the
defendant’s objection would be sustained because delaying the judicial
decision about ownership could affect the value of the land, which would
decrease due to the rumors about the ownership dispute.259
Another North African rabbi of the sixteenth century, Radbaz,
commented that the court should not permit the plaintiff to split his or her
claims if the judge believes that the plaintiff wants to harass the defendant
repeatedly with one claim at a time in order to make the defendant take a
new oath each time.260 In such a case the plaintiff has no legitimate reason
to split one cause of action, contrary to the cases mentioned by Rashbatz.261

258. Rashbatz's opinion was accepted by the main halakhic codifiers. See Rema, Hoshen Mishpat,
SHULKHAN ARUKH, § 24.
259. See RESPONSA RASHBA 1:1077.
260. RESPONSA RADBAZ 4:1281.
261. Therefore there is no contradiction between Rashbatz and Radbaz, as explained in PITHEI
TESHUVA, SHULKHAN ARUKH, Hoshen Mishpat, Sec. 24.
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B. The Rationale: Truth Finding as a Major Element of Justice
The concept of non-finality of judgments is rooted in the central
feature of the Jewish legal system: the discovery of truth. The late Israeli
Supreme Court Justice, Haim Herman Cohn, stated that Jewish law is
without parallel among other systems of law in that the discovery of truth is
an element of justice and the law is subordinated to it.262 Jewish law is
religious law, and as such the central idea guiding the judge is truth-based
litigation, an objective imposed on the judge as a religious obligation.263
This obligation has implications on several levels.264 Discovery of the truth
is perhaps the most central value to shaping the approach of Jewish law to
the nature of litigation.265
As I have written elsewhere, Jewish law constitutes a normative
system in which religious commandments inform adjudication.266 The
judge is responsible not only to the litigants standing before him but also to
God. This system differentiates Jewish law from secular systems operating
in the liberal Western tradition. In modern Western legal systems, judges
must render a clear and unequivocal decision on any legal question brought
before them, and they are not perturbed by the possibility that their rulings
might later be deemed mistaken.267 By contrast, Jewish law does not
impose an unqualified duty on the judge to render a decision. The Talmud
praises the judge’s responsibility and duty to render true justice: “he who
judges in truth, even for a single hour, the Writ gives him credit as though
he had become a partner to the Holy One, blessed be He, in the act of
creation.”268 At the same time, Talmudic sages stressed that rendering
judgment was an act carrying transcendental significance that required the
judge to assume solemn religious responsibility for a ruling that might turn
out to be mistaken.269
The Jewish rabbinical courts, the function of which is to establish the
truth, were not designed to carry out proceedings in a conflict-solving style,
as were the common law systems. Rendering a true judgment based on true
262. See H. COHN, HAMISHPAT [The Court] 119 (1992).
263. YUVAL SINAI, THE JUDGE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN JEWISH LAW 469-70 (2009).
264. See id. (discussing the repercussions of that obligation on the formulation of the modes of
court intervention in judicial proceeding, in view of the sources of Jewish law).
265. See id.
266. See Yuval Sinai, The Religious Perspective of the Judge's Role in Talmudic Law, 25 J.L. &
RELIGION 357, 357 (2009-2010).
267. In Judge Pollock's opinion, see Judicial Caution and Valour, 45 L.Q. REV. 293, 296-97
(1929), a judge's readiness to risk a mistaken judgment is necessary to promote the creative
development of the law.
268. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Shabbat 10a.
269. See, e.g., Sinai, supra note 266.
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facts is the main function of the Jewish judge. Consequently, an incorrect
judgment is absolutely null and void, and it may be said that the judge has
not finished his work until he gives a true judgment. Therefore, if the judge
finds that his judgment is incorrect, he must reconsider the case and meet
his obligation to render true judgment.270
The litigant’s right to reopen a judgment raises the following question:
would inconsistencies in judgment undermine the court’s prestige and
public respect for its decisions?271 The sages were aware of this matter and
discussed it in the Talmud.272 As we have seen above, the accepted
approach is that a judgment can usually be reversed if it is incorrect. The
first judgment will be reversed not only in cases involving clear evidence
of error but also in cases where the judgment’s accuracy is placed in doubt
by new evidence.273 This principle was justified by the view that the
objective of a judgment in Jewish law is to reflect the truth.274
CONCLUSION
This Article confronts the common assumptions that a legal system
cannot exist without some form of res judicata and that every legal system
has produced a body of RJ law. We have seen other legal systems reject
some of the main tenets of RJ. For instance, German law includes RJ that is
narrower in scope than that in common law systems. Jewish law rejects RJ,
although it does include some diluted version of RJ. The Article also argues
that the RJ rules raise difficulties and present many moral, conceptual,
social, and cost-of-efficiency drawbacks. Res judicata rules also provide
problematic incentives to the parties involved. However, the problems of
RJ mentioned in the article do not necessarily imply a complete indictment
of the concept of RJ, and some good arguments support at least a minimal
concept of RJ. But the arguments presented in this article should lead to
reconsideration of the contemporary broad-scope common law model of
RJ.275

270. SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 425.
271. See discussion supra Part I.B.3.
272. See Ziluta de'bay dina, in 12 TALMUDIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 119 (1991).
273. See SHOCHETMAN, supra note 210, at 429.
274. This is also why the argument of prestige of the court as grounds for RJ is not applicable. See
Appeal 18 (1957), in 2 ISRAELI RABBINICAL COURTS DECISIONS 262, at 265.
275. In Sinai, supra note 132, I outline the basic elements needed for redesigning the rules of claim
preclusion, proposing to abolish the strict and broad rule against splitting a cause of action that is being
applied in contemporary common law, and argue in favor of a more lenient and flexible rule. The
proposed model should seek to include in a single lawsuit only what is efficient to include in that
lawsuit from the perspective of both the courts and the litigants, as it is not necessary to fully litigate all
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An analysis of broad-scope RJ in common law reveals that the
traditional justifications for RJ provided by common law jurists should not
be considered the primary reasons why common law systems have
accepted the doctrine of RJ in its broad scope. The relative weakness of the
traditional justifications is manifest, especially in light of the strong
arguments against RJ. A legal system that favors broad-scope RJ, as do
common law systems, could merely reflect a principled approach that
prefers such values as public interest, consistency, stability, and efficiency
to truth finding. But in modern common law RJ is not applied consistently
with these professed values that common law jurists use as justifications for
the doctrine. To the contrary, the primary cause for accepting the rules of
RJ in the Anglo-American systems can be best understood under the
conceptual “conflict solving” approach of the adversarial system, whereas
the traditional justifications serve more as rhetorical justifications. The
main objective of the court in an adversarial system is not to ascertain the
truth but to resolve disputes objectively and to choose between the
contentions of law and fact laid before it by the litigants.
An analysis of the conceptual contentions against RJ shows that RJ is
inconsistent with some of the major aspects of the behavior modification
model. Furthermore, RJ does not necessarily contribute to an economically
efficient legal system. Conceptually, the effects of RJ are inconsistent with
some of the main characteristics of the Anglo-American system itself and
contradict many of the valued features of procedure, such as litigants’
authority and persuasion opportunities, correctness, revisionism, economy,
and consistency. The litigants’ autonomy is especially disregarded with the
application of claim preclusion, which forces the plaintiff to submit the
subject matter of the entire case relating to the cause of action at one time,
once and for all, including every remedy flowing from the cause of action
based on the subject matter. The rules of RJ also limit the litigants’
persuasion opportunities by denying them the opportunity to persuade the
court to reverse an incorrect judgment. In principle, as argued in the present
Article, there is no reason why the rules of RJ could not be limited to the
narrow question of whether the prior action actually decided the issues
necessarily involved in awarding the judgment. According to this approach,
RJ is a drastic measure and should be applied only in clear cases in which a
matter has been directly litigated, when one “has had his day in court,” and
ought not to be extended to matters that could or should have been raised
and litigated in the first action.

grievances arising from a transaction. In my proposal, the default rule permits splitting a single cause of
action, with exceptions to the general rule.
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The rules of RJ, especially those of claim preclusion, do not comport
with the behavior modification model because they have a negative and
harmful effect on the conduct of litigation. The rule of claim preclusion
forces the plaintiff to aggregate into one lawsuit all the claims and remedies
that may be developed from one cause of action, significantly aggravating
the dispute between the parties. At the same time, under a more flexible
system that allows splitting a cause of action, the plaintiff can pursue his or
her claims in stages using legitimate strategic considerations and would
therefore not be forced to press his or her claims to the utmost, as would be
the case under the common law system. The court should allow the plaintiff
to split the cause of action in such cases ex ante (when requested by the
plaintiff at the beginning of the proceedings) or even ex post (when not
previously requested). The rules of claim preclusion act as major obstacles
to achieving a desirable behavior modification model of litigation and to
reaching a settlement. This does not mean, however, that the court should
always allow splitting claims. In Jewish law, the court could not (by law)
permit the plaintiff to split his or her claims if the judge believes that the
plaintiff is dishonest and wants to harass the defendant repeatedly with one
claim at a time in order to damage the defendant. This limitation makes
sense because in such a case the plaintiff has no legitimate reason to split
one cause of action since the split would not contribute to the behavior
modification of litigation.
Forcing litigants to include all factually distinct claims in one action
may have additional disadvantages, including a significant negative effect
on cost efficiency for both the litigants and the courts since the parties are
forced to litigate their potential claims to the utmost. By contrast, if the
plaintiff is permitted to sue in the first stage for part of the remedies
without the danger of the other remedies being blocked by estoppel, there is
a reasonable chance that some plaintiffs may choose not to sue for the other
remedies. An ex ante analysis of the rules of cause of action and issue
preclusion shows that the broader the scope of the claim preclusion, the
higher the costs of particular procedures will be, harming access to judicial
decision making. Ex ante considerations of broad-scope claim preclusion
may prevent plaintiffs from submitting their claims altogether because
litigants need to aggregate all of their claims and remedies into one cause
of action, which may increase trial costs to a prohibitive level.
The RJ rules that prohibit the tribunal of first instance from
reconsidering its decisions do not help prevent erroneous decisions and are
not desirable from the perspective of either the behavior modification
model or from the point of view of cost efficiency. By contrast, the
procedural system of Jewish law allows the trial judge to reconsider his or
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her decision and to render a revised decision if needed, which contributes
greatly to an efficient judicial process of error correction. When trial courts
are able to relitigate cases and to take advantage of information that
litigants have about erroneous decisions the incidence of mistakes is
reduced at a lower cost than that of error correction by appellate courts.
Unlike the appellate judge, who learns the factual and legal grounds of the
case at the appeal, the trial judge is familiar with the details of the case and
needs to learn only the litigants’ arguments about the errors in his decision.
After the trial, the defeated litigant has the time and a strong incentive to
review his or her objections to the trial court’s decision. Introducing these
objections to the trial judge at this stage results in an efficient process that
gives the judge an opportunity to reconsider the decision. If given the
opportunity to correct his or her mistakes after the trial, the judge is likely
to take advantage of the opportunity in order to prevent undesirable
reversals by the appellate court. Allowing relitigation in the trial courts
would also compensate for the absence of reexamination of factual issues
by the appeals court because in the trial court factual issues can be
reconsidered more economically.
The second model of RJ, the German model, does not recognize the
concept of RJ in the broad sense used by the common law legal systems.
The narrow scope of RJ in the German model seems superior to the broader
rules of RJ that apply in common law, but the German model is also
problematic from the point of view of cost efficiency. Some of the features
of the Continental and German appellate process result in inefficient
judicial error correction since the process does not provide for relitigation
by the trial court.
The third model, the Jewish law model, relies on the concept of nonfinality of judgments. Although RJ has some effect in Jewish law, the
effect is minimal compared with the common law and Continental
jurisdictions. In the Jewish legal system a judgment is always subject to
revision, normally by the court that rendered it in the first place, if new
evidence has come to light undermining the facts on which the judgment
was based, provided that the party seeking to adduce such new evidence is
not barred from doing so. Every judgment is also subject to revision for
errors of law. The traditional, ancient concept of non-finality of judgments
in Jewish law also applies in the contemporary rabbinical courts authorized
in the modern State of Israel. Nevertheless, the acknowledged lack of
finality in Jewish law arose at a time when no appellate-level court existed
in the Jewish Law system. Once Israel established an appellate court
process, the nature of finality changed (though a broader residual discretion
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is left to trial adjudicators in religious courts to reopen cases that have not
yet been appealed).
Jewish law has long recognized the difficulties of allowing endless
litigation between the same parties. Religious sages have sought a balance
between the demand of justice that a case be reconsidered when the losing
party argues that new evidence establishes the truth and the need to settle
disputes without allowing them to drag on endlessly. As a result, the
halakhic codifiers accepted an important limitation to ensure that disputes
are eventually settled. These procedural rules are accepted in contemporary
rabbinical courts authorized in Israel and instruct judges to ask the parties,
after all the claims and evidence have been presented at trial, whether they
have additional claims and evidence. If the parties declare that they have no
further evidence or claims, the court will not accept further evidence or
claims in the future, unless the litigant gives a credible explanation for the
delay. As a result of this rule, in practice, few requests to reverse a
judgment are submitted to the Israeli rabbinical courts. The trial court has
the right to reverse its erroneous judgment only if the case has not been
addressed by the Rabbinical Court of Appeals. After the Rabbinical Court
of Appeals gives its final judgment, the trial court is not authorized to
reconsider the case.
Jewish law also adopts a balanced approach toward claim preclusion,
both from the perspective of the behavior modification model and from the
point of view of cost efficiency. In principle, the plaintiff has the right to
divide a cause of action into different stages and to submit different claims
because he or she may have legitimate reasons for doing so. Nevertheless,
the court does not permit the plaintiff to split his or her claims if doing so
would harm the defendant, or if the judge believes that the plaintiff is
attempting to harass the defendant by submitting one claim at a time. The
unique concept of non-finality of judgments in Jewish law is explained by
its central feature, which is without parallel in the dominant legal systems
of the West, whereby discovery of the truth is an element of justice to
which all else is subordinated. The function of the Jewish rabbinical court
is to establish the truth and not to solve conflicts. Rendering a true
judgment based on true facts is the main function of the Jewish judge, and
incorrect judgments are null and void. The work of a Jewish judge is not
finished until he or she gives a true judgment. Therefore, if the judge finds
that his or her judgment is incorrect the judge must reconsider the case and
reverse it in order to fulfill his or her obligation to render true judgments.

